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ABSTRACT

This thesis is designed to delve deeper into perceptions of identity, specifically gender
and racial identity, the power relationship that emerges as each of these switches is reached in
the progression towards genocide, and the effects of these perceptions during and after the
genocide takes place. The primary question addressed is whether the power relationship that
emerges as a result of these pre-genocidal stages becomes gendered and racialized due to
perceptions rooted in a male-dominated hierarchy and a belief in the superiority of one ethnicity
over another.
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze the power relationship in the pre-genocide
and genocide stages between the perpetrator and the victim on the macro or group level and the
micro or individual level. Using the case studies of the Balkan genocides, the Sudanese
genocides of Nuba and Darfur, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this thesis will attempt to
illustrate the idea that the identities of both perpetrator and victim are constructed in order for
one to wield power over the other. Within each case study, genocidal tools such as genocidal
rape, gendercide, propaganda and indoctrination are addressed in their relation to the gendering
and racializing of power relationships in genocide. The effects of the Balkan, Sudanese, and
Rwandan genocides are still felt by both survivors and perpetrators, and continue to play a role in
how the groups relate to one another, and the case of the Sudanese genocides is still ongoing.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
―For him she is sex-absolute, no less. She is defined and differentiated with
reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the
inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute- she is
the Other.‖ (De Beauvoir, 1952: xxii)
Hiebert‘s (2008) ―Three Switches‖ theory of genocide states for a genocide to take place,
three stages must reached: the establishment of the out-group as the ―Other‖, the out-group is
assigned super-human qualities by the in-group, and finally the out-group becomes sub-human
allowing for murder and other genocidal crimes to take place. Hiebert‘s theory is fundamentally
tied to identity particularly identity as it relates to belonging to a group, and how individuals in a
group perceive themselves and others. The stages as described reflect a dangerous slope that may
possibly result in genocide without intervention and with certain circumstances taking place. The
proposed analysis of this thesis is designed to delve deeper into perceptions of identity,
specifically gender and racial identity, the power relationship that emerges as each of these
switches is reached in the progression towards genocide, and the effects of these perceptions
during and after the genocide takes place. The primary question to be addressed is whether the
power relationship that emerges as a result of these pre-genocidal stages becomes gendered and
racialized due to perceptions rooted in a male-dominated hierarchy and a belief in the superiority
of one ethnicity over another.
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze the power relationship in the pre-genocide
and genocide stages between the perpetrator and the victim on the macro or group level and the
micro or individual level. Using the case studies of the Balkan genocides, the Sudanese
genocides of Nuba and Darfur, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this thesis will attempt to

illustrate the idea that the identities of both perpetrator and victim are constructed in order for
one to wield power over the other. Other case studies were considered, but these case studies
were chosen for temporal reasons since they occurred within the past twenty years, are the most
recent cases of genocide, and each occurred or began relatively around the same time. The
effects of the Balkan, Sudanese, and Rwandan genocides are still felt by both survivors and
perpetrators, and continue to play a role in how the groups relate to one another, and the case of
the Sudanese genocides is still ongoing. The author also has done previous research with each of
the cases and has interest in how the perception of gender and racial identity played a role in who
was targeted and which genocidal tools were used within these specific cases of genocide.
Theoretically, in order to reinforce a new power relationship, constructed identities
become entwined with perceived gender roles and other stereotypical notions of race and
ethnicity. The secondary thesis question will be to analyze the effect of these ascribed gender and
ethnicity roles and power structures in post-genocide society. This secondary hypothesis is
framed within a social constructivist perspective focusing on the idea that identities are fluid and
do not disappear once the traumatic event has concluded.
As the focus on three cases studies suggests, this analysis will be primarily qualitative in
nature using secondary sources and primary sources where available. First, because of the
potential subjectivity of identity, power, and genocide, these terms must be defined. Second, a
study in alternity must be conducted, and the in-group and out-group must be defined exploring
how one group becomes favored and/or dominant over another group. Third, it must be
determined how power and the relationship between the in-group and the out-group become
gendered and racialized. In addition to the temporal and other reasons stated above, the case
2

studies of Balkans, Rwanda 1994, and Sudan, both Darfur and Nuba, were chosen because in the
preliminary review of the cases all three showed signs of gendering and racializing power and
the relationship between the in-group and out-group through genocidal tools such as rape and
indoctrination. Even as the case studies have taken place under disparate circumstances with
different groups targeted, the analysis would look for specifically for commonalities in the use of
genocidal tools and the structure of the power relationship between the in/out-groups.
This thesis would primarily be a discussion of human security, and as with most
qualitative analyses of genocide, the main goal would be to identify a pattern so that measures
could be taken to prevent genocide in the future. Also, the effect of gendering and racializing
identity of a specific group could have lasting repercussions for reconciliation and peace within
and outside of a state. The main theoretical perspectives used in the analysis would post-colonial
and feminist/gender International Relations theory. Genocide represents the worst a society can
offer. Exploring the power relationship between in- and out-groups may shed light as to why
genocide still occurs.
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CHAPTER TWO: DEFINITIONS

This chapter is designed to offer definitions of the contentious terms of genocide, power
and identity that are used within this thesis. The definitions have been constructed to play a role
in the goals of the theoretical analysis in the gendering and racializing of power in genocide.
Genocide
Raphael Lemkin (1944) created the word genocide by taking the Greek genos, meaning
race or tribe and combining it with a derivative of the Latin verb caedere, which translates to kill
or cut. The intent of the definition was to name the action of eliminating a culture from
existence. Lemkin (1944) wrote:
―[Genocide] is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups,
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan
would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national
groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and
even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the
national group.‖ (79)

In 1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was
adopted laying down a broad and somewhat vague legal definition of genocide. Article II states:
―Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members
of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.‖
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With only a few exceptions, the UN Convention definition stands as the most commonly used
definition for genocide. Still, even the UN Convention definition remains controversial primarily
because of its vagueness, and any other proposed definition would be problematic. Perspectives
on genocide can vary between the overly narrow to the extremely broad or can be based in legal
concerns or of the human condition. Before stating the definition to be used for this thesis, the
decision on why not to include certain aspects must be explained. First and foremost, the
definition used here will not focus on legality of genocide primarily because the goal of this
thesis is not prove that genocide occurred in each of the three case studies. Legal definitions of
genocide especially those based in adversarial system of justice are preoccupied with
establishing responsibility, intent, and focus on the evidence that genocide occurred. Also in
many legal definitions, distinctions are made between war and genocide. Still, war and genocide
can occupy the same space and time, and one occurring does not exclude the other from
occurring. Arguing responsibility and intent, and tackling the debate between war and genocide
would be counterproductive since this thesis is focused on the ethnic and gendered perspectives
of power and identity. The assumption has been made that the three case studies of the Balkans,
Sudan and Rwanda are accepted cases of genocide even though all have faced a certain degree of
debate over the years as to whether or not genocide took place. For the purposes of this thesis,
the terms ‗war crimes‘ and ‗genocidal acts or actions‘ are being used interchangeably.
The UN Genocide Convention‘s definition is problematic primarily because of the lack of
inclusion of political groups. This is a major line of contention within the field of genocide
studies because the exclusion of political groups has limited investigation into and prosecution of
other cases of suspected genocide. As was stated earlier, the UN Convention‘s definition is also
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vague and allows for multiple perspectives including those focused on legal intent. For these
reasons, the UN Genocide Convention‘s definition of genocide cannot be used as the primary
definition for this thesis.
The goal of this definition, in the tradition of Lemkin (1944), is not focused on assigning
responsibility or primarily determining intent but to describe the human condition and the reality
of the situation as it affects those who are being targeted. As was stated previously, this
definition is not a legal definition, but rather a definition focused the population and the situation
at hand and is based in Card‘s (2002, 2003) and Goldhagen‘s (2009) social death and
eliminationism theories, respectively. So thus, genocide would be the targeted elimination of a
group of people linked through some aspect of identity by a governmental authority using direct
tactics such as murder and rape, and indirect tactics such as indoctrination and displacement. All
of these tactics have been used to dehumanize victims thus making the genocide possible and to
further to goal of elimination. In each of the case studies, different combinations of direct and
indirect tactics were used to carry out the goals of elimination.
The different types of tactics are introduced here and will be more thoroughly reviewed
in a forthcoming chapter. Direct tactics such as root and branch murder, targeting of males and
rape serve as primary means of eliminating the targeted group. Root and branch murder, or
femicide, refers to the expansion of the massacre to include the extermination of women and
children. The targeting of males, or androcide, specifically refers to the extermination of boys or
men of a population who are of military age and could possibly offer resistance. Genocidal rape
typically occurs in three forms: rape of women, rape of men, or rape by coercion. Under each is
the intention to humiliate and shame members of the victim group. Indirect tactics such as
6

indoctrination, famine creation, or displacement also need to be taken into account. These tactics
have a tendency to be subtle and most likely would not fit neatly into the legal definitions
because the intent to commit genocide is difficult to prove. Indirect tactics function as a way to
control and humiliate the targeted population, and many times resulting in death. Indoctrination
can vary in manner ranging from setting up a power hierarchy within the targeted population
where no power actually exists to forcibly changing a belief structure or identity through
reeducation, and the effect of this is to disintegrate the identity of the targeted group from the
inside out. Similar to indoctrination, propaganda is used to manipulate information and identity,
but the difference lies in the intended target. With propaganda, the target is the in-group
population in order to convince them of the out-group‘s super-humanity or sub-humanity.
Famine creation typically is initiated through artificial means by controlling the targeted
population‘s access to food and water. Displacement can emerge from famine when people are
forced to flee in order to locate new food and water sources, as well as engineered plans of a
government such as military bombardment or forced relocation.
Power
The term power has multiple meanings ranging from the amount of control a person or
group has to a supply of energy. For the purposes of this thesis, power on the macro level will
primarily refer to the degree of political or economic control a group is perceived to have over
another group. A common perception is that the amount of power available is fixed implying if
one person or group has power then another is lacking. This perception can generate ill will with
a group believing their power has been diminished in some way by the perceived ascent of
another group. This idea plays an important role particularly in circumstances leading to
7

genocide, and is most obvious in Hiebert‘s (2008) super-human pre-genocidal stage. Here the
target group is perceived as taking away power from the in-group or having more power than
they should. The almost tangible perception of power that begins to form in the pre-genocidal
stages increases the potentiality of genocide occurring.
Another effect is a hierarchy of power can develop leading to and enforcing genocidal
activities, and could perhaps hamper attempts at post-genocide reconciliation. In order to
preserve this hierarchy, a group may instill measures to maintain power by any means necessary.
In the post-genocide phase, resentment would continue and possibly reverse the in-group/outgroup structure that was in place prior to the genocide creating the potential for another genocide
to occur. The idea of a hierarchy of power will be addressed in more detail in the analysis of
ethnic and gendered perspectives of power and identity.
On the micro or individual level, power refers to the authority that one person believes to
have over another person‘s life. This idea is apparent once the genocide has begun and in the
genocidal tools used. For example, a génocidaire commits rape or coerces a man to rape a
woman, both of the targeted group. The act becomes a way to demonstrate superiority and to
humiliate the victims. In this scenario, the génocidaire holds the belief that he or she has
authority over the other‘s life and will use any means necessary to exhibit it.
Identity
The concept of identity plays an important role in defining genocide. As was stated
previously, aspects or types of identity link members of a group, and can take the form of gender,
racial, political, religious, national, or any other possible personal identifications. Identity can be
inclusive by linking people together and at the same time, exclusive by limiting membership.
8

Typically, identity is fluid meaning that certain personal identifications can change over time
such as religious or political affiliations, but in situations leading to genocide, identities become
rigid and in/out-groups form based upon perceptions of this fixed nature of identity. No simple
definition exists for identity because it is dependent on perspective. On the individual level, a
person‘s identity would be formed by his or her unique experiences through the course of his or
her life. For the context of this thesis, though, identity will mainly refer to the potential
polarizing racial, tribal, political, and/or religious associations which come to exist in the stages
prior to genocide. The subject of gender identity and gender roles will be addressed in a later
chapter as well as the definition of racialization.
The Imagined Community
These polarizing associations mark what is known as an imagined community. According
to theories put forth by both Anderson (1983) and Semelin (2007), imagined communities are
constructed based upon loose and perceived commonalities in the modern era such as race,
ethnicity and so on. This section is to serve as a brief introduction the imagined community.
Anderson (1983) focused primarily on the role of nationalism and how it determines the
imagined community. He defined it as imagined since most of members of the community would
never interact but still perceive a relationship with each other, and as a community because of the
―deep, horizontal comradeship‖ (Anderson 1983, 6-7).
Semelin (2007) takes the concept one step further deciphering between the imagined
community, ethnos, and the common citizenry, demos, applies it to other possible ways for a
group to be linked, and stresses the importance of the ‗Other‘ in the creation of an imagined
community. While people can be linked through citizenship, in times of crisis, it does not inspire
9

the same degree of loyalty as the imagined community. Thus the ethnos resembles a ―community
of ‗us‘ constructed at the expense of some ‗Other‘, perceived as a profoundly different ‗Them‘‖
(Semelin 2007, 28). While the concept of the ‗Other‘ will be fully addressed in Chapter Four, the
ethnos is dependent on the ‗Other‘ being established since differences need to be marked so the
identity can be fully realized.
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CHAPTER THREE: PREVIOUS STUDIES

Since this thesis focuses on the gendering and racializing of power, this chapter will
consist of primarily previous studies and analysis of gender and the perception of ethnicity and
identity in genocide. The study of genocide is broad with multiple perspectives with some
focusing on legal aspects and others focusing on social aspects. Within the field of genocide
studies, issues are hotly debated since multiple perspectives exist including whether or not to
label a conflict as genocidal. So thus, the discussion here will be limited to the gendered analysis
and identity construction. The fields of gendered analysis of genocide and identity construction
in genocide have been used to explain why genocide occurs.
Concerning Gender
With a gendered approach in the study of genocide, the main goal has been to embody
the woman in genocide. This means to shed the non-entity or blank slate perspective and look at
the woman‘s status in genocide. Early analyses focused on the woman as a victim, and questions
were asked: how does the woman‘s experience differ as to a man, and does genocide affect
women differently than men? With the Akayesu decision, the debate was further broadened with
the recognition of rape as an act of genocide.
Gendering of genocide first focused on the woman‘s experience. Fein (1999) was one of
the first who used a gendered analysis of genocide focusing on voice of women and the effect of
genocide on women. Others followed suit focusing on rape and other crimes against women in
order to bring the woman‘s experience to the forefront. Still, few previous studies exist
specifically covering a gendered analysis of genocide. As focus expanded on the woman‘s
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experience, focus on the man‘s experience began to decrease. Warren (1985) first supplied a
definition of gendercide as a sex-neutral term reflecting purposeful annihilation, but failed to
present any examples targeting specifically males. Also, Warren‘s (1985) work was not specific
to the field of genocide studies but rather took a broader scope including female infanticide and
witch trials. Jones (2002, 2006) picked up Warren‘s (1985) mantle and has delved deep into the
gendercide debate offering perspectives on both femicide and androcide within genocides of the
latter 20th century. Lindner (2002) analyzed humiliation and the role it plays in genocide and
how the progression from honor societies to human rights societies can play a role in escalation
towards genocide. Humiliation has played a significant role in genocide since assigned gender
roles give the responsibility of protection to the man. Von Joeden-Forgey (2010) has expanded
upon Jones (2002, 2006) research specifically analyzing the roles of feminine and masculine in
genocide. Still, there are aspects within the study of genocide that have had little to no analysis
including the participation of women in genocide, the rape and emasculation of men, and the
children born as a result of genocidal rape. This thesis has the hope of adding to the discussion
and building upon previous research in the area by looking at gender on a societal group level
and the effect of it on the escalation towards genocide.
Since the Akayesu decision (ICTR website), genocidal rape has been brought to the
forefront in the discussions of genocide. With this decision, the discussion of rape entered the
field of genocide studies. The Akayesu decision has been named for the perpetrator first
convicted of rape within genocide. In 1998, Jean-Paul Akayesu was convicted of genocide and
crimes of humanity including rape and other inhumane acts within the 1994 Rwandan genocide
(ICTR website). The Akayesu decision is discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven. For rape
12

to be included as in the discussion of and a means of genocide has been groundbreaking. With
this movement from the private sphere to the public sphere, rape became more than just sexual
violence against a person but rather a means to demonstrate power and control over others. The
power relationship between the rapist and the victim within genocide serves as an example of the
power relationship between the genocidaires and the victim group. The genocidaires seek to
dominate their victims purposefully until the point of death. Still, it is highly controversial to
equate rape with genocide primarily for two reasons: rape is a function of the individual level,
and genocide is a function of the societal/state level; and rape is still viewed as a crime of sex
rather than a crime of power.
Concerning Identity
The perception of identity, while only once piece of the puzzle, has played a significant
role in understanding why genocide takes place, and the study of identity perception in genocide
has helped to expand perspectives of genocide including prevention. The ways in which identity
has been perceived by an in-group and/or an out-group, particularly the emergence of the
‗Other‘, in pre-genocidal stages has shed light on the relationships between said in-group and
out-groups. While not every conflictual social relationship escalates into genocide, the studies
provide markers such as stereotyping and blaming of the ‗Other‘ which if addressed early and
comprehensively may help to diminish the likelihood of genocide in the event of major economic
or political crises. Hiebert (2008) presented a theory on the social construction of identity in
genocide which this thesis is partially based on. Hiebert‘s (2008) ―Three Switches‖ theory
offered a Constructivist perspective on the stages leading up to genocide and how the perception
of identity plays a role. Semelin (2007) addressed the power relationship between the
13

génocidaire and the victim groups but through the lens of identity. Semelin‘s (2007) work
meticulously reviewed the psychological and sociological markers in the escalation towards
genocide and the willingness of participants. It is through the exploration of how the ‗Other‘
comes into being some understanding might be achieved in how a conflictual situation escalates
and erupts into violence. Moshman (2007) and Waller (2007) also addressed the progression
toward genocide through the ‗Us v. Them‘ lens reviewing psychological markers such as the use
of derogatory terms for the out-group.
Ethnicity as a construct of identity has been a topic that has only been recently broached
within the field of genocide studies. Most perceptions of ethnicity as it relates to genocide have
been discussions of ‗old hatreds‘, essentialistic in nature, and used as an excuse of noninterference by outsiders (Power 2002). This is mainly because as a conflictual situation
escalates towards genocide, the perceptions of identity become hardened by the in-group.
Previous studies in gender and identity as it relates to genocide studies may be few in
number but they offer insight and have led the field of genocide studies into new areas and
perspectives.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ALTERNITY, THE “VICTIM” IDENTIFICATION,
AND THE IMPLICATIONS
―The death of an evil ‗them‘ makes possible the omnipotence of ‗us‘.‖ (Semelin
2007, 17)
Genocide cannot occur without a target. Genocides taking place within the past century
have been different in target and aim, but the establishment of the target has been present in each
occurrence. Target groups emerged because of their alternity or the perceived ‗Otherness‘
established to mark the difference between the target group and the in-group. This chapter
focuses on how groups become perceived as the ‗Other‘ and includes discussions of the
Feminine Other and the victim identifications. The reason for this chapter is because before the
power relationship can be analyzed, the unique relationship between the ‗us‘ and the ‗them‘ must
be discussed and understood.
First, the clarification must be made that physical attributes such as skin color or social
attributes such as language will not be a part of the discussion. While these attributes can play a
role in the establishment of the ‗Other‘ or out-group, evidence suggests ‗Otherness‘ would not be
able to be sustained singularly on these attributes (Semelin 2007; Hale 2008). The perception and
attitudes one group develops toward another appear to have more influence in the stages leading
up to genocide than the physical and social attributes. The focus on physical and social attributes
lends itself to essentialism which may disregard other factors including perception and alternity.
This concept of essentialism is highly fatalistic and can be best described by the phrase, ―ancient
hatreds‖ where animosities are believed to be historically rooted (Varshney 2007). For instance,
the social attribute of religion played a role in the establishment of groups in Yugoslavia with
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differences marking the Orthodox Christians (Serbs), Catholic Christians (Croats), and the
Muslims (Bosniaks) from each other. As conflict gained international attention, this social
attribute became a tangible dividing line in the viewpoint of many outsiders justifying noninvolvement since the groups hated each other for generations. What would be the point of
interceding if the conflict was destined to occur? Essentialism plays against the goals of this
thesis because of the fatalistic mindset in approaching the study of genocide.
The primary approach used in the discussion of alternity will be Constructivism. The
main aspects of the Constructivist approach are based upon the idea that identity is built though
collective and individual experiences over time, and that group identities are imagined constructs
and are fluid. These imagined communities (Anderson 1983; Semelin 2007) can change and be
based upon trivial commonalities or sacred ideas. The imagined community can be linked
through any number of physical or social similarities, but as Semelin (2007) proposes, for the
imagined community to exist, a second group must be created to explain what the first group is
not. This is where the ‗Other‘ emerges. The ‗Other‘ is created because differences are perceived
by members of the imagined community and is believed to be in opposition. Thus, alternity
would represent a negative aspect of the imagined community since this division between the
‗Other‘ and the members of the community could result in conflict and possibly genocide. The
relationship is not perfectly correlated because of other factors, but where the ‗Other‘ has
emerged, the potential still exists. The imagined community becomes the in-group or what would
be considered the societal norm.
The identity of the Hutu and Tutsi groups of Rwanda is recognizable as constructed
because of the outside influence of Belgian colonial rule. The biggest misconception is that the
16

Hutu and Tutsi groups are of different ethnicities. Prior to colonial rule, the Tutsis were the
cattle-owning class and the Hutus provided the labor (Jones 2006). The Belgians constructed the
identities of the Hutu and Tutsis as ethnic through defining appearance. ―The Hutus, described as
short and stocky with heavy facial features, supposedly contrast with the tall and slim Tutsis with
fine features‖ (Semelin, 2007: 26). The Belgians assigned ethnicity to class distinctions based
upon their belief in the racial and economic superiority of the minority Tutsi and enforced this
through an identification card system (Semelin 2007). When Rwanda gained independence, the
card identification system was kept in place, as well as the mythology of the constructed
identities of the Hutu and Tutsi.
Semelin (2007) suggests the in-group becomes the perpetrator group out of an imagined
anxiety or fear. ―The ‗transmutation‘ of insidious anxiety into a fear concentrated on a hostile
‗figure‘ serves as the foundation for hatred to develop against the evil-minded ‗Other‘‖ (Semelin
2007, 16). Through this fear and hatred, what becomes the perpetrator group unites against the
group perceived as the ‗Other‘. The focusing of attention on the victim group is a way to rebuild
the in-group after a major crisis. The out-group becomes the ‗Other‘ through the imagined
differences of ethnicity, religious beliefs and class because these are superficial markers of
difference. They create a duality between ‗Us‘ and ‗Them‘ because the belief exists that either
one belongs to a certain ethnicity, religion or class or does not belong. The identity of the outgroup forms parallel and divergent to the in-group. The out-group may or may not be already
present as a minority, but as a crisis deepens the out-group can be perceived as being larger and
more influential than they actually are, lending to the growth of fear and hatred. The out-group
becomes the ‗Other‘ because of the perceived differences with the in-group, but that does not
17

mean the out-group is destined to be a victim group. As the in-group faces an economic or
political crisis, qualities are assigned to the out-group and are exaggerated to create the
perception of an enemy, one who is responsible for all of the problems of the in-group. Maureen
Hiebert‘s (2008) Three Switches theory of genocide refers to the stages of the constructed
identity of the out-group:
―(1) the identification of the victim group as outside or foreign to the political
community; (2) the identification of the victim group as an almost superhumanly
powerful, dangerous ‗enemy within‘ whose continued existence threatens the very
survival of the political community; and (3) the paradoxical identification of the
victim group as subhuman.‖ (Hiebert 2008, 12)

If the identity of the out-group is constructed then the identity of the in-group must be
constructed as well. The identification of the victim or out-group as foreign and the perpetrator
or in-group as the ‗Us‘ in the ‗Us versus Them‘ scenario is only the first step towards genocide
but does not mean that genocide will occur. Each of the stages must be reached until the victim
group is viewed as subhuman.
Alternity exists as a general phenomenon and can be based on any number of differences
existing between two or more groups. De Beauvoir (1952) noted how the woman was perceived
to be in opposition to the man based in accepted gender roles thus creating the Feminine Other.
The Feminine ‗Other‘ can play a role in the power relationship emerging in the pre-genocidal
conditions leading to genocide.
The Feminine ‗Other‘ simply put is where the woman is not defined as a woman but
rather what a man is not and qualities are applied to enforce these differences. These qualities or
stereotypical gender roles create a duality between the perceived positive or masculine and the
negative or feminine. Within these stereotypes, a man may be described as rational, strong,
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courageous, independent, and assertive while a woman may be described as emotional,
compromising, weak, dependent, and passive. The masculine and feminine identities emerging
from these stereotypes are a social construction, meaning that a personality aspect of a man or
woman is applied to all men and all women. The woman is in opposition to the man and the
qualities applied to the woman take on a negative connotation since the masculine qualities are
ideal and valued by society. While the concept of the ‗Feminine Other‘ is based in Liberal
Feminist thought and began as way to denote the woman‘s relationship to a man, the ‗Feminine
Other‘ does not necessarily have to be a woman. A man can be made into a ‗Feminine Other‘
through humiliation.
The duality between the feminine and the masculine emerges prominently in traditional
honor societies which are defined by the inequalities between men and women. The man acts as
the defender against humiliation and the woman is either regarded as property or equated with
children (Lindner 2002). In these traditional honor societies, the duality and resulting inequality
between the masculine and the feminine is cemented through the expectations and roles applied
to men and women. Dignity and humiliation are two important yet opposing aspects of a
traditional honor society. Lindner (2002) defines humiliation as ―as the enforced lowering of a
person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honor or
dignity‖ (2002, 137). The dignity of a man is held above all else, and the man would be
humiliated if that dignity were to be stripped away. Humiliation is used as a way to emasculate
the man. This emasculation makes the man less and the socially constructed feminine role is then
applied.
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The humiliations and inequalities of the traditional honor societies become more
egregious in the face of the transition of Western society into human rights societies. Human
rights societies differ from traditional honor societies because of the egalitarian view of men and
women.
―Humiliation, already hurtful in an honor society where it is used routinely as a
means to put people down or keep them down, becomes much more hurtful when
it occurs in a human rights society. In a human rights context, humiliation
acquires an explosive potential‖ (Lindner 2002, 142).
The differences between two groups in an honor society can be rectified through violence as an
accepted means of resolution. In a human rights society, the violence is not accepted, escalating
and resulting in genocide.
Victim identifications play a role in how the ‗Other‘ is perceived with the selfvictimization of the in-group and then, the victimization of the out-group. There are no clear
signals as to when the self-victimization of the in-group turns into the victimization of the outgroup, but still it appears the second would not appear without the first. Here the dynamic of the
‗Us vs. Them‘ has been realized, and while the out-group becomes the ‗Other‘, the in-group
begins to perceive itself as the victim of some hardship brought on by the out-group, such as an
economic, political or social crisis. This self-victimization of the in-group reflects Hiebert‘s
(2008) superhuman stage where the out-group is held responsible for the crisis, and the in-group
becomes the ‗afflicted Us‘ (Semelin 2007). By considering itself a victim, the in-group believes
it would gain strength through this knowledge. ―There occurs a sort of transmutation of the
initial trauma through this saving and grandiose ‗us‘, through which individuals can draw
strength required for their collective recovery‖ (Semelin 2007, 24, emphasis by the author). In
essence, the in-group is attempting to regain self-esteem, and by focusing the responsibility on
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the out-group for the grievance, the in-group would be able to attain the status it once had. Once
the blame has been laid upon the out-group, the transition to the victimization or dehumanization
of the out-group would begin (Moshman 2007; Semelin 2007).
The victimization of the out-group reflects the desire to build the self-esteem of the ingroup in the belief that if you diminish the enemy, then you will be elevated to a superior
standing. This sub-human stage also foreshadows the potential of violence to occur against the
out-group. ―Whereas the mortal-threat conceptualization (the second switch) provides the
motivation and rationale for genocide, dehumanizing the victim group makes the actual genocide
psychologically palatable and, therefore, makes its perpetration possible‖ (Hiebert 2008, 13).
The identity of the out-group transforms into something reflecting the less, the subordinate, or
the impure. The out-group becomes equated with pollution that taints the social body (Semelin
2007, 34). If the pollution can be removed, then the in-group would regain its so-called purity.
References to cockroaches, as a euphemism for Tutsi, were common in the months prior to the
1994 Rwandan genocide. Through this, the perpetrators were able to reduce their targets to the
level of insects.
Alternity is a fundamental aspect in the progression towards genocide. The establishment
of the ‗Other‘ allows for the out-group to become a target of frustration and discontent for the ingroup. An economic, political or social crisis acts as a catalyst intensifying malcontent feelings.
From this, the conflict between the in-group and out-group escalates providing the groundwork
for what would become genocide.
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CHAPTER FIVE: ETHNIC AND GENDERED PERSPECTIVES OF
POWER IN GENOCIDE
―Force- it is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing. Exercised
to the limit, it turns man into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse
out of him‖ (Weil quoted by Semelin 2008, 49).

This chapter will cover gender and ethnicity as it relates to power in genocide briefly
touching on the IR theoretical frameworks supporting the analysis, as well as theories as to how
genocide becomes racialized and gendered and the description of the genocidal tools used to
reflect each perspective. The imagined community can be linked through multiple avenues, but
for the purposes of this thesis the focus will be on the ethnic or racial imagined community. The
‗Other‘ emerges from perceived differences, and the ‗Feminine Other‘ begins to play a role.
Even though ethnicity and gender are treated separately, aspects of each overlap and are highly
entwined. The reason for the separation is for clarification purposes only.
Before ethnic and gendered perspectives are discussed, how a hierarchy of power comes
into being must be addressed. The main perception of power is that it is a zero-sum game
meaning that the amount of power available is fixed (Mann 1986). Power is not gained by one
player without the loss to another player creating a struggle between those who are perceived to
have power and those who do not. The power hierarchy is constructed based upon these
perceptions and the desire for and the protection of power. The hierarchy exists with the
beginning stage of the formation of the ‗Other‘ because the sharing of power between the ingroup and out-group is not equal. As the conflict progresses toward genocide, the imbalance
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becomes significant. This relationship between the in-group and out-group in the stages prior to
genocide is illustrated in the below table.

Table 1. Perception of Power and Effects1

Formation of the ‗Other‘

Super-Human/ SelfVictimization Stage

In-group
Perception: power status
relatively stable

Out-group
Perception: power status lower
than in-group

Effect: possible desire for
protection of power or
increase in power
Perception: power is being lost
to the out-group; need for
protection of power increases
against perceived threat

Effect: possible desire to
increase power; some
vocalization
Perception: power lost to ingroup increases

Effect: desire for power
increases; sparse violence
against out-group
Sub-Human/ Victimization
Stage

Perception: power has been
regained and must be
protected at all costs

Effect: need for protection of
power increases; minimal
vocalization
Perception: power lost to ingroup increases

Effect: desire for power
Effect: vocalization decreases
continually increases; violence significantly
against out-group increases
1. Sources: Hiebert 2008; Moshman 2007; Semelin 2007; Waller 2007

Even though this is a generalization, the perception of power by the in-group is highly
different from the perception of the out-group. For the in-group, the perception of control of
power shifts dramatically between the in-group and out-group and can possibly account for the
intensification of animosity in the progression towards genocide. As the in-group‘s perception of
power shifts, violence against the out-group can escalate. Also, for the in-group to reaffirm its
power status, the out-group‘s power must be diminished since the belief in the zero-sum game of
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power. For the out-group, power is perceived to be gradually lost over time, and vocalization of
the desire for a balance of power also decreases. As each stage is reached, the in-group‘s
perceptions begin to diverge dramatically from the out-group‘s perceptions. So thus by the time
the last stage is reached, two different constructs exist occupying the same space.
Ethnic Perspectives
While it has been argued that ethnicity and race are separate, race and ethnicity are both
constructs of society. They overlap and will be used interchangeably to denote perceived
differences other than gender. First, there will be a brief introduction to Postcolonial IR theory
which provides the theoretical basis for the differentiation of race/ethnicity in society.
Racializiation of power will address how the power relationship between the in-group and outgroup becomes striated along tangible ethnic lines. Ethnicization exposes how ethnicity becomes
tangible in the pre-genocidal stages creating the duality of ‗Us vs. Them‘ along ethnic lines. The
genocidal tools focus more on indirect methods such as Cultural Genocide and Propaganda. The
first focuses on the extermination of the culture while the second focuses on increasing
participation in the perpetrator group through the creation of a negative perception of the
potential victim group.
Postcolonial IR Theory
Subaltern or Postcolonial theory developed as a theory to better explore and understand
experiences of what was then called the ‗Third World.‘ The terminology of ‗Third World‘ is now
considered outdated since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and does not really capture the
intricacies and differences of life within former colonies in Africa, South Asia, and South
America. Historically, there has been a lack of understanding with Western colonizing nations in
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reference to their colonial territories, and the thought of overlaying western ideals on top of
colonies and expecting them to accept it without question was common. Belief in western
superiority led to a unique relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. This in turn led
to economic dependency once the colonies gained legal independence.
The importance of culture is the primary concept in postcolonial or subaltern theory.
Robert J.C. Young defines the postcolonial as ―the result of different cultural and national
origins, the ways in which the color of your skin or your place or circumstance of your birth
define the kind of life, privileged and pleasurable, or oppressed and exploited, that you will have
in this world‖ (2009). He goes on to state that ―the postcolonial seeks to develop a different
paradigm in which identities are no longer starkly oppositional or exclusively singular but
defined by their intricate and mutual relations with others‖ (2009). The struggle of the
postcolonial is deeply tied to the attempt to affirm its identity as separate from colonial powers,
but at the same time, it can have a negative effect on identities in place prior to colonization. The
struggle between the colonial and the colonizer becomes the struggle between the postcolonial
and the postcolonial.
Racialization of Power
In addition to the gendered power relationship in genocide, another dimension exists in
the relationship between the in-group and out-group focusing on ethnic or racial differences
between the two groups. To reiterate, the racial dimension of power is not separate from the
gender dimension but rather the two interact and overlap creating the circumstances for genocide
to occur; still, the racial and gender dimensions are analyzed separately to clarify the distinctions
within each dimension. References to the ethnic or race are based in perceptions of identity.
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Fundamentally, the identity of the group is linked to perceived ethnic or racial distinctions. These
distinctions are imagined constructs, built over time and in most cases flexible and fluid. During
conflict and genocide, these constructs are made real at least in the minds of the in-group. This
switch makes the out-group real and tangible. The out-group becomes what the in-group is not
thus creating the duality needed for the genocide to occur. Ethnicity and race are addressed here
as constructs of modern society and a simplified way of differentiating one group from another.
Due to cultural differences such as religion, skin color, language, or countless other markers,
ethnicities are perceived as different from one another. As was stated previously, these are only
constructs reflecting perceptions of identity. Race as a fundamental aspect of identity plays a role
in the conflictual relationship, emerging in the stages before genocide occurs. For the purposes of
this essay, the terms of ethnicity and race are used interchangeably reflecting the base cultural
identities. Power becomes differentiated based upon the perception of these cultural identities.
As was stated in the previous chapter, the example of the formation of the Tutsi and Hutu
identities shows how ethnic identity was constructed then hardened. The power relationship
between these two groups was based in perceived racial differences. The question of multiple
ethnicities in a conflictual situation is a non-issue since from the viewpoint of the in-group; the
ethnic identity of the out-group is formed in opposition to the in-group. Thus, this would allow
the lines between multiple ethnicities to be blurred and perceived as one ethnicity.
Ethnicization
Power along racial lines is the fundamental aspect of the creation of the ‗Other‘. The outgroup is perceived to have qualities in opposition to the in-group‘s qualities, and this opposition
is denoted as being less. As the ‗Other‘, the out-group becomes defined based upon what the in26

group is not. This ethnic differentiation becomes tangible, and the ‗Other‘ becomes the victim
group. The hardening of ethnicity, or ethnicization, gives birth to the idea of ‗Us vs. Them‘, and
the duality between those who are and those who are not. In ethnicization, race and ethnicity
becomes essentialized and sentimentalized. Memories of events and aspects of culture and
ethnicity become distorted with the conflict in the duality perceived as being historically relevant
and accepted as constantly present. This could be based in a perceived old grievance or an aspect
of ethnicity being elevated to almost divine status. This process increases the possibility of
genocide occurring through the perception of one ethnicity or race being superior over the other.
Genocidal Tools
While murder and other direct methods used in genocide can be racially motivated, the
genocidal tools addressed in this section will focus primarily on indirect methods carried out in
the pre-genocidal and genocidal stages. These indirect policies carry with them the intention to
build support for direct policies and eliminate the out-group. Ethnocide or cultural genocide
addresses the purposeful elimination of cultural aspects which make up an identity of a group.
Indoctrination is the forced re-education/ assimilation of members of the out-group into the ingroup. Propaganda is used stimulate support from the population of the in-group for their
leadership‘s direct policies. Each of these allows for the expansion and continuation of genocide.
Ethnocide
As a part of his definition of genocide, Lemkin (1944) made it clear that attacks on the
cultural aspects of a group were to be considered acts of genocide. To target a group because of
aspects that make them different is an integral point in genocide. Even as identity is a construct
of experiences and perspectives, culture acts as the positive form of identity for a group. Cultural
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aspects create interdependency between different groups in non-genocidal situations because of
their symbiotic relationships. Different groups interact and weave a global cultural web. With the
elimination of one culture, the effect would be felt throughout this web. Ethnocide specifically
targets aspects of the culture to be eliminated. These aspects can include artisans, intelligentsia,
religious affiliations, and political affiliations. Ethnocidal policies would be aimed to limit access
and participation within each of these aspects, isolating and suppressing the target group. Used in
tandem with direct policies such as disappearances, property destruction, and murder, these
policies would also have the effect of creating fear which would drive the power hierarchy.
Examples of ethnocidal policies would include criminalization of religious worship, assembly, or
speech by the target group, displacement, and artificial famine. These may also coincide with the
use of rape.
It is important to note that ethnocidal policies by themselves would not necessarily
denote genocide as occurring. Instead, they act more as a harbinger of genocide coinciding with
the sub-human pre-genocidal stage. These policies help to solidify the power hierarchy leading to
increased risk of genocide occurring.
Indoctrination
As a method of ethnocide, indoctrination is the coercive re-education of individual
members of the out-group to force them to shed aspects that would define them as members or
the mental removal of a collective identity under the threat of death and then superimposing the
in-group identity. The goal of indoctrination would be to create new in-group members who
would be willing to carry out genocidal policies of the state. Children and so-called prisoners of
war would be primarily targeted for indoctrination since they would be easily separated and
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confined. Indoctrination creates a temporary stock of willing participants, and the cannibalization
of the out-group takes shape. Members of the out-group begin to carry out genocidal policies
against other members further damaging its integrity. Examples of this are prevalent in the
Sudanese genocides where boys would be isolated and re-educated as Arab and/or Muslim. They
would then be forced to serve in the military to carry out government policies against their own
peoples.
Propaganda
As a genocidal tool, propaganda is one of the most insidious since it works on an
emotional and subconscious level. With its massive scope, propaganda broaches both the
gendered and ethnic perspectives because it can reflect the Feminized ‗Other‘ as well as racial
characterizations which further isolate the out-group. First, it must be clarified that propaganda
while loosely covering editorial cartoons, pamphlets, and other audio-visual communications is
generally used to promote policies in favor of the state, and many times is benign in nature.
Propaganda as a genocidal tool is specifically used to garner support for genocidal policies,
shape identities, and galvanize negative sentiment toward the out-group. It plays on the fears of
the in-group through the use of stereotypes. These stereotypes would imbue characteristics
perceived by the in-group onto the out-group enhancing the separation and play upon notions of
the sacred. Out-group women would be characterized as overtly sexual (Jones 2006) or ethnic
features would be exaggerated and distorted. Illustrations would create the ―evil-minded ‗Other‘‖
(Semelin 2007) giving members of the in-group a physical representation of the out-group. With
this, the out-group becomes homogenized, and the distorted physical representation characterizes
its members. Radio programs and other media characterizing out-group members as animals and
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non-human were prevalent in both the Balkan and Rwandan genocides (Jones 2006; Melvern
2004; Neuffer 2001). Specifics of the propaganda common to these genocides will be covered in
the case studies.
The emotional nature of propaganda helps to galvanize the in-group‘s hatred and distrust
of the out-group. Semelin (2007) states the basic nature of propaganda is to provide ―a new
universe of meaning for all.‖ It invents emotions and galvanizes hatred and distrust to such an
extent that the society is propelled into genocide. Propaganda becomes the screaming voice that
cannot be avoided, and the version of the world that propaganda creates becomes necessary for
survival and belonging (Semelin 2007).
Ethnic perspectives of power in genocide reflect the emotional and mental status of a
group. The constructs that create identity become hardened, and through genocidal tools, the outgroup becomes demonized.
Gendered Perspectives
In genocide, the power relationship between the in-group or potential perpetrator group
and the out-group or potential victim group becomes gendered. This occurs as a result of the
determination of the in-group to reclaim and hold on to their dominance in society. The outgroup becomes the ‗Feminine Other‘, and allowing for conflict to degenerate into violence and
genocide since the identity of the out-group was obfuscated and diminished. The victim group is
perceived as something less. This section first explores Gender IR Theory, then the gendering of
power, and finally the genocidal tools of genocidal rape and gendercide reflecting the gendered
aspect of genocide.
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Gender IR Theory
Before discussing the topic of Gender IR Theory, Feminist IR Theory must be briefly
introduced. Feminist IR Theory began as a critique of mainstream IR theory and is varied in its
approaches. The critique lay in the fact that the discussion of women and their roles on the state
and international levels was severely lacking, but this did not encapsulate the perspectives in
Feminist IR theory. At the forefront, though, was a movement to expose the biases prevalent in
mainstream IR theory and ―make women visible as social, economic and political subjects in
international politics‖ (Steans 2006, 27). Liberal, Standpoint, Marxist, Radical, Poststructuralist,
and Postcolonial Feminist approaches deal with different issues pertaining to women, women‘s
status in the international community, the construction of femininity, and the patriarchal
hegemony in the public sphere. The position of women in global society has been the priority in
much of Feminist IR Theory (Tickner 2001).
While descended from the Feminist discussions, Gender IR Theory would be an attempt
to move beyond preconceptions and/or misconceptions which emerge as a result of the
terminology. The idea would be to use ‗gender‘, a sex-neutral term, to diminish the notion that
women are central and the priority. Feminist theory is beginning to move beyond that idea in
order to encapsulate a more balanced approach in the analysis of masculinity and femininity, and
the use of ‗gender‘ would only reflect that. The goal would be to expose the application of
gender roles in society and in the international sphere, and deconstruct them. The assumption
here is that if these gender roles were to be broken down then the dichotomy between the
masculine and the feminine can be reduced. The ‗Feminine Other‘ would also be diminished
because it relies heavily upon the notion of gender roles. With gender roles deconstructed, the
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‗Other‘ would not be a necessary identification and not exist thus keeping the ‗Feminine Other‘
from being vilified. Gender IR Theory is inclusive of masculinity studies reflecting the
assumption that masculinity is constructed as much as femininity. The constraints of the
construction of masculinity and femininity affect men as much as they do women. This would
also represent a new direction since men‘s and women‘s experiences in the global society would
be treated and explored equally. Gender viewed along a continuum would reflect more
accurately the roles that women and men play in society. Gender IR Theory would also open the
discussion of the status of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender identifications and issues in the
global society of which have only been minimally addressed in Feminist IR Theory. Gender IR
Theory would serve as an extension of Feminist IR Theory focusing on the roles that men and
woman play as humans in the global society and expanding the critique of IR Theory to include
notions of masculinity.
Gendering of Power
Substantial evidence exists to support a gendered analysis of genocide. As members of a
victim group, men are killed because of their ability to fight back, women are killed because of
their ability to give life, and both are raped as a humiliation. As members of a perpetrator group,
both men and women willingly participate in the rapes and murders against members of a victim
group. Traditional gender roles appear to take precedence in the rationalization of murdering and
raping men and women of the victim group. Men are seen as the protectors and women as
mothers to the next generation and are targeted because of these roles. The traditional gender
roles on the individual level of the perpetrator group seem to diminish in the face of the overall
identity of the perpetrator group. The identity of the group takes precedence over the identity of
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the individual. Gendered identities of the masculine and feminine as a duality are applied to each
group. The perpetrator group absorbs aspects of masculine gender roles, and its identity becomes
more masculinized. At the same time, feminine gender roles are applied to the victim group and
thus becoming unwillingly feminized or emasculated. Because of the acceptance of the duality of
gender as a current norm in society, feminization is equated with emasculinization.
The duality societal gender construction plays a significant role in genocide. The gender
role of the feminine is applied to the victim group, and the masculine is absorbed by the
perpetrator group enhancing the perceived identity differences between the two groups. The
inferiority of the out-group prior to genocide can reflect a gendered inferiority. The relationship
between the in-group and out-group takes on a patriarchal hierarchy where the in-group takes on
the masculine and the out-group receives the feminine. The role of the male in the hierarchy is
played by the perpetrator group. Societal gender roles are accepted as perpetually essential to the
structure of the in-group, and the valued masculine attributes are elevated. The out-group
unwillingly plays the role of the woman and becomes the ‗Feminine Other‘.
Power as function in IR Theory in matters of genocide becomes gendered extending the
dichotomy between the masculine and the feminine to the societal level. Through the use of
Gender IR Theory as a critical theory, the author attempts to bring to light the problem of
gendered power. Thus, the gendering of power would represent the antithesis of Gender IR
Theory with a possible solution rooted in the deconstruction of predominant and perceived
gender roles in non-genocidal societies.
The possibility of women becoming genocidal may be explained by the masculinization
of the perpetrator group. The participation of women in genocide still remains a mystery. If the
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belief women are more nurturing than men were to hold true, the question remains as to why
women would participation in the systematic destruction of a group. As the perpetrator group
absorbs the masculine, the feminine disappears since it is applied to the victim group. The
identity of the perpetrator group becomes primary, and its members become willing to commit
murder against the perceived enemy in order to protect it. Also, since the masculine and the
feminine have been constructed, it can be argued that the gender roles existing prior to the
genocide were false and misleading, but as the conflict and violence becomes more frequent,
gender roles become hardened within a void. Still, the void needs to be satisfied, and this allows
for the gender roles to be amplified on the societal level.
Genocidal Tools
In the gendering of power in genocide, tools are used to enforce the power dynamic
between the perpetrator group and the victim group, and can be active or passive. The active
tools to be discussed here are genocidal rape and gendercide. Genocidal rape as a physical act
can fall under three categories: rape of women, rape of men, and rape by coercion. Each category
has the ultimate goal of humiliating the victim and to make the victim seem less. Gendercide as
defined by Jones (2004) is a gender or sex neutral term for the specific targeting of either sex for
elimination. The active targeting of females is commonly referred to as femicide or root-andbranch, and the targeting of males will be referred to as androcide.
The targeting of men and women in genocide can be passive as well with actions such as
artificial famine and forced displacement. These are considered passive because the intent of
these actions is not easily discernable. Artificial famine, meaning the purposeful withholding of
food and water or the active creation of conditions that would result in a famine, may or may not
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be determined to be targeted against a specific group. Forced displacement typically is used
against a specific group, but can possibly be justified to be at the group‘s ‗best interest‘ by the
perpetrator group. The result of both can have detrimental effects on the population of the target
group by separating families, weeding out the infirm, and diminishing the ability to reproduce.
Thus, while not actively damaging the physical body as with rape and murder, these actions help
to maintain the genocide by creating conditions where the active targeting can take place.
Genocidal Rape
The tool of genocidal rape is the desire to humiliate and shame members of the victim
group. Before actually killing the woman or man, she or he would be tortured through mutilation,
branding, beating or a combination there of. Rape is an illustration of power dynamic between
perpetrator and victim group on an individual level. Even outside of genocide, it is used to
enforce dominance of one person over another. It is not a crime of sex but rather a crime of
power. As a genocidal tool, genocidal rape becomes a means to exterminate the target group (De
Vito 2008).
Rape of women, as a tool of genocide, typically occurs due to one out three intentions:
murder, forced maternity or to remove the victim‘s ability to have children (Card 2008;
Carpenter 2000; Reid-Cunningham 2008; Von Joeden-Forgey 2010). Forced maternity is a
means of controlling the womb and ensure the children of the rape victims would be of the
perpetrator group. Here women would be considered a ‗blank slate‘ meaning that once
impregnated, they were no longer considered to have the ‗qualities‘ of the victim group. Their
status can be rewritten due to the predominance of the patriarchal societal structure. Still, those
children born as the result of the rape and grew up after the active genocide concluded were
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shamed and part of neither victim nor perpetrator group. They were considered outside and
established a new ‗Other‘ as a result of the genocide. Women were also raped as a means to
destroy their ability to have children by doing so much damage to their sexual organs that they
were no longer able to be pregnant (Von Joeden-Forgey 2010). This active prevention of births
did as much physical damage as mental if the victim especially survived the attack and genocide
since a woman who was unable to carry a child would be shamed as well and would be undesired
as a wife later in life.
The rape of men can be carried out by either men or women and is specifically intended
to humiliate and emasculate the victim. While it is rarely discussed, rape of men is not
uncommon in genocidal situations. The rape of men with the aims of damaging and killing
occurred in multiple situations ranging from the rape of boys by genocidal women and the rape
of men by other men in concentration camps. The reason this action is rarely discussed because
of the level of shame it generates. The victim has had his ‗maleness‘ removed by another, and
would be considered less by society if it were known. Rape by coercion is where a man is forced
to rape a family member, neighbor or another member of the victim group under the threat of
death. This is particularly damaging since it tears at the heart of the familial unit and the societal
structure of the victim group. Literally, the victim is turned into a perpetrator and continues the
cycle of violence. Trust within the victim group would break and allow for the perpetrator group
to further their goals of eliminating the victim group.
Femicide
Femicide or root-and-branch murder reflects the specific targeting of women within the
victim group. When femicide occurs, genocide typically is in full swing. Root and branch murder
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refers to the expansion of the massacre to include the extermination of women and children
(Jones 2006). The genocide enters the private sphere reflecting the perspective that women and
children are defenseless because men have been removed. The extermination becomes justified
because of the belief that women are the carriers of culture. The belief is based in the ability of
women as mothers to bring up and teach the next generation.
The following concept helps to illustrate the reason why the belief exists. Biologically,
the movement of blood by the heart throughout the body is what determines a person to be alive.
As the first aspect of this concept, blood signifies life. The second aspect, culture, is the lifeblood
of a group of people. It is what defines, connects, and holds them together. Without it, the people
are just individuals living in the same area. Woman is the third aspect of the concept. A woman‘s
monthly bleeding represents that woman‘s fertility or ability to give life. In most familial
relationships, it is the mother who teaches succeeding generations the beliefs, knowledge and
traditions of the culture to which they belong. Women are primary if the culture is to survive and
be fertile. Through this reasoning, the interconnection of women, culture and blood lends
credence to the importance of women in sustaining a culture, and to why they become targeted as
the extermination expands.
Androcide
The term androcide has been commonly used in Biology to denote the removal of
maleness on a microbiological level. The problem with the term androcide is that the legal
definition is synonymous with homicide (Free Dictionary website). Since homicide refers to
murder on the individual level of analysis, the use of androcide can be potentially problematic
because it appears to refer to and straddle both the societal level and individual level. The term
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was found in use in an analysis of feminist utopias (Anderson 1990) to mean the destruction of
men, but it is not commonly used in genocide studies. This, though, may be more of a symptom
in that the targeting of males is not highly covered by genocide scholars (Holter 2002; Jones
2006). So thus, the individual analysis level connotation will be largely ignored for the purposes
of this thesis, and androcide will specifically mean the targeting of males in within genocide.
The targeting of males first in genocide represents the physical emasculation of the
victim group. Prior to the violence, the men and women are separated leaving the remaining
members, women and very young children, of the victim group vulnerable to genocide
(Buchanan 2002). The study of this kind of harbinger genocide is new because of the
assumptions of the ―gender-neutrality of men‘s lives‖ (Von Joeden-Forgey 2010, 67). The
targeting of males has been an accepted part of war because of their ability to fight back and
defend their families. So thus androcide, particularly of ‗able-bodied‘ males, has not been
addressed in the extent it should be. ―Génocidaires can use patriarchal traditions in international
law semantically to hide their crimes behind putative counterinsurgency efforts‖ (Von JoedenForgey 2010, 67). The destruction of the male population of a victim group can serve as a way to
predict femicide since once the male population is eliminated the female population would be
left vulnerable. Few instances exist where androcide has been explicit have occurred, one being
Srebrenica which will be addressed in further detail in the Balkan case study.
The power relationship in genocide is complex but the end result is one group exerting
dominance over another. This struggle becomes gendered as the out-group is equated with
prescribed feminine aspects that denote qualities that are not of value or undesired. The
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genocidal tools used to enforce the disparity reflect the gendered power relationship further
escalating the violence.
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CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY I: THE BALKAN GENOCIDES
―Can you imagine 15,000-16,000 people screaming at the same time? I think that
half of Serbia could hear us. And the world didn‘t know what was happening?
Everybody saw what was happening. But they didn‘t want to help‖ (Sabaheta
Felić as interviewed by Leydesdorff 2011, 4).
The Croat, the Bosniak, the Serb, and the Kosovar
Under Tito, Yugoslavia was supposed to serve as a model of multicultural integration,
but as the last decade of the 20th century began, it became quickly evident this was no longer the
case. During his presidency, only the Yugoslav identity existed so how could it have splintered
so easily into at least four: the Croat, the Bosniak, the Serb, and the Kosovar? This chapter is to
serve as a study of Balkan identities, how they were shaped prior to and by the genocides, a
review of the events, and detailed examples of genocidal tools used. The constructs of the Balkan
identities affected how power was used during the genocides. In the quest for power,
genocidaires would humiliate and emasculate their targets. Many times they would self-victimize
so the genocidaires could blame their victims for atrocities further igniting their hatred and
destructiveness.
Live Within the Sorrow: June 28, 1389 & World War II
Events deep in history remained present in the active identities prior to the war and
genocide. During the war, these perceptions of history were misinterpreted as essentialist or as
‗old hatreds‘ particularly by those watching from the outside:
―The hatred between all three groups… is almost unbelievable. It‘s terrifying and
it‘s centuries old. That really is a problem from hell‖ (Warren Christopher, March
1993 quoted by LeBor 2006, 49).
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Maybe this perception was based in an unwillingness to interfere, but it was also based in
ignorance. Balkans‘ perception of history is not in the past but as a part of the present. Traditions
and legends have been passed down orally, keeping them present in minds and hearts. It was not
victories which have been at the heart of the legends, but rather events drenched in death,
destruction, and loss. The Kosovo Polje, the Jasenovac and the Nazi occupation during World
War II affected and currently affect how the different identifications see themselves and others.
The legend of the Kosovo Polje is remembered as a great battle where the Serbs, a nation
of farmers deciding that life as a part of the Ottoman Empire was not a feasible option, gathered
arms and fought against the Muslim invaders.
―Legend had it that, before the battle, the Serb prince Lazar was offered a choice
by God: an empire on earth, which meant he would live, or an empire in heaven,
which would require his death as a Christian warrior on the battlefield. Lazar,
vowing it is ‗better to die in battle than to live in shame,‘ went on to die nobly
─sacrificially─ at Kosovo Polje‖ (Neuffer 2001, 12).
Six hundred years later, the perception of the events with the sacrificial heroism of the
Serbs has become a celebrated myth and has been used as a catalyst for Serb nationalism. The
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist took place on the anniversary of the
Kosovo Polje, June 28, 1914, thus sparking World War I. The reality of the events of the Kosovo
Polje was somewhat different than what the myth had created. Those who took up arms were not
only Serbs but Croats and other Balkans, and Serbia and Bosnia did not come under Ottoman
rule until over a century later (Neuffer 2001).
World War II affected the Balkan region and shaped the identities that would be present
again fifty years later. As the armies of Nazi Germany spread southward through Europe, they
found allies in a fascist Croatian movement called the Ustasha and elevated members to positions
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of power. The Ustasha were highly nationalistic, believed in a ‗Croatia for Croats‘, and were
willing to take any measures to insure it (Wilmer 2002). Two counter movements evolved in
response to the Ustasha: the Partisans, a combination of Serb and Bosniak antifascists and the
Chetniks, nationalistic Serb antifascists. The Ustasha purposefully targeted Serbs and other nonCroats imprisoning them within concentration camps and murdering them. This purification
program was collectively known as Jasenovac (Wilmer 2002). The Chetniks were not without
culpability. They targeted non-Serbs in much of the same way as the Ustasha with a faction
sympathizing with the Nazi regime.
The multiple Balkan identities seem to live within their sorrow with each group taking on
the victim identification based in these events and the victim becoming the hero. The extreme
loss through death and destruction becomes valued as if the current suffering would eventually
be somehow rewarded. Historically, this has been present in the legend of the Kosovo Polje and
the remembrance of the Jasenovac. This leaves the author curious if and how Srebrenica is
absorbed into the Bosniak identity and mythology.
Titoism & (Un)Official Identities
When Marshall Tito took power in 1953 as the President of Yugoslavia, he came in with
the express intent of creating a Yugoslavia free of dissenting ethnic identities. The ethnic
fragmentation during World War II was to be diminished if not eliminated from history. BosniaHerzegovina was his shining beacon of success. On the surface, the ethnic identities of Serb,
Croat and Bosniak, or Bosnian Muslim, seemed to disappear mostly due to Tito‘s determination
for it to be so. Under Tito‘s rule, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the most integrated state of
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Yugoslavia. A Bosniak lived next to a Croat without issue for years. Tito was once quoted as
saying:
"Let that man be a Bosnian, Herzegovinian. Outside they don't call you by another
name, except simply a Bosnian. Whether that be a Muslim (Bosniak), Serb or
Croat. Everyone can be what they feel that they are, and no one has a right to
force a nationality upon them." (Josip Broz Tito quotes website)
Marshall Tito saw a Yugoslavia free from the historical ethnic identities. There was no statewide reconciliation effort between the groups in the hopes they would be forgotten (Neuffer
2001). Under Tito, the official identity was Yugoslav, and any references otherwise could have
resulted in imprisonment or worse (Neuffer 2001). The totalitarian system under Tito was able to
implement his wishes, but after his death, the system fell apart allowing for the historical
ethnicities to resurface. His influence, albeit intense, lasted about thirty to forty years, and after
his death in 1980, the cracks in the ethnic integration became apparent. The rise of ethnic
nationalistic leaders, Milošević in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia, signified the end of Tito‘s era
of unity and brotherhood (Power 2002).
Through propaganda, the new nationalistic leaders took advantage of the lack of
reconciliation after World War II and were aware that even though the official identity of
Yugoslavia was ‗Yugoslav‘, the unofficial identities of Croat, Serb, and other Balkans were kept
alive through the oral tradition and thus were able to turn them into enemies. Within seven years
after the death of Tito, the ethnicities became polarized under the new nationalist leaderships.
Milošević gave speeches in Kosovo celebrating the Kosovo Polje and promising that Kosovo
would always remain a part of Serbia, and Tudjman removed Serbs from public service and
openly thanked God that his wife was ―not a Jew or a Serb‖ (Neuffer 2001, 21).
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In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. The polarization was most
evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina where integration was most prevalent under Tito‘s reign, and by
1992, Bosnia fell apart along the renewed ethnic lines.
War Crimes & Ethnic Cleansing
First, it must be clarified that genocidal acts were performed by all groups during the war
and genocide, but this should not and does not diminish the victim status. As Wilmer (2002)
points out, this participation was not equally distributed, and not all groups were equally guilty.
Reports and witness accounts have been documented describing Bosniak and Croat cruelty, but
most of the accounts, trials, and convictions in the ICTY reflect higher Serbian participation
(ICTY website). In ICTY convictions, 70% have been Serbs, 19% have been Croats, 4.7% have
been Croats/Bosniaks, 4.7% have been Bosniaks, and 1.6% has been Kosovar. With this
acknowledgement, this case study will focus primarily on Serbian genocidal actions, but will
also address instances of Bosniak and Croat war crimes where available in order to diminish the
appearance of bias.
The war began in the former Yugoslavia in 1992, and the term ‗ethnic cleansing‘ was
introduced into the lexicon. ‗Ethnic cleansing‘ signified the physical removal of other ethnicities
from areas believed to belong to Serbs, Croats or any of the other Balkan ethnicities. This policy
was predominantly used by the Serbs in Bosnia to remove Bosniaks and Croats from territory
thought to be Serbian, but was also used by the Croats in Croatia to remove Serbs. Cities such as
Sarajevo and Srebrenica came under siege by Serb snipers and artillery fire. Camps sprung up,
some prisoner and some for those seeking refuge and family members, and attacks on civilians,
systematic murder, rape, and property destruction were prevalent. As will be described in further
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detail below, these acts continued until 1995 with NATO air strikes and Operation Storm and the
eventual signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (Power 2002).
The province of Kosovo within Serbia, though, was not included in Dayton. Serbs in
Kosovo constituted a minority (10%) in comparison to the Kosovars (90%) or ethnic Albanians
and began complaining about persecution (Power 2002). Before the war in 1989, Milošević was
able to strip the province of its autonomy so that it was then under the control of Belgrade,
politically and militarily (Neuffer 2001; Power 2002). As was stated previously, the Kosovo
Polje was an extremely significant event in Serb history and memory and used by Milošević to
fuel anti-Kosovar sentiment. As Kosovo was not included in the Dayton peace negotiations,
many felt it necessary to protect Kosovo from Serb domination, and this led to the formation of
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It is to be noted that the KLA used guerilla tactics in their
goal to protect Kosovars, but in response to KLA attacks, Serb armies and militias would murder
civilians and raze whole villages. From 1998-99, approximately 800,000 Kosovars were forcibly
expelled to Albania and Macedonia and about 10,000 Kosovars were killed (Jones 2006).
Propaganda
Nationalistic propaganda was prevalent in the years before and during the war and
genocide galvanizing support. Misinformation including exaggerated enumerations of the dead
and rumors of attacks dominated the Serb airwaves and print media. Milošević‘s rhetoric spoke
to the fears of Serbs living in Bosnia and Croatia giving them the title of victims of Bosniak and
Croat dominance and warmongering (ICTY website). Any information on the massacres of
Bosniaks and/or Croats was quickly discredited. Neuffer (2001) quoted Bosnian Serb leader
Karadžic claiming that a bombing in Sarajevo had actually been staged by Bosniaks: ―It is quite
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clear from TV material that corpses several hours old were being manipulated on the
marketplace and these ‗corpses‘ even included plastic and textile human-size dummies‖ (61).
Serbs who watched these telecasts believed Serb TV thus igniting feelings of mistrust, fear, and
hatred leading them to destructive and genocidal behavior.
In the trial of Milomir Stakić, Ivo Atlija gave testimony detailing Serbian propaganda and
its effects:
―A. In my view, the most important cause was aggressive propaganda by the then
recently founded SDS in Prijedor.
Q. And you say that it was aggressive. What are we talking about? What type of
propaganda?
A. We're talking about verbal propaganda, first of all, where members of other
non-Serb nationalities were publicly called "Ustasha, fundamentalists, balijas,
Turks," and other such derogatory names.
Q. You say that this was the SDA propaganda. Were the Croat national party, the
HDZ, or the Muslim national party, the SDA, indulging in such propaganda?
A. They had very few possibilities to reach the media, to use the media, and go
public. So that there was no opportunity for them to really counter the SDS with
their own propaganda.
Q. And why was it that the SDS had a greater possibility of reaching the media?
A. Because with the assistance of the JNA, they occupied the repeater at
Mrakovica from which -- from then on they started emitting only the Serb
programmes and also through the Vjesnik in Prijedor, which were the only local
newspapers. And they banned and stopped all other information from Croatia or
any other republic where Serbs were not a majority group.
Q. Can you tell us roughly at what date it was, the year, and if possible, the
month, that the repeater at Mrakovica was occupied?
A. I think it was in late 1991, or possibly early 1992. I'm not sure, however.
Q. You told us that the type of propaganda was to use derogatory names such as
Ustasha, balijas, Turks, do you recall any other specific propaganda that was
relayed?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And what was that?
A. I will list some of the more drastic examples. Information was released that Dr.
Mirza Mujadzic had given pregnant Serb women injections, the consequences of
which that those women could only give birth to female children and the birth rate
among Serbs in that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina was thus reduced.
Q. Where did you hear that, with a that on television or the radio or did you hear
that at some kind of a meeting?
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A. That was on Radio Prijedor, and then it spread by the word of mouth.
Q. What was the reaction of the Serbs, for example, that you worked with to this
propaganda? Did they accept it, or were they skeptical?
A. In my view, the reaction was difficult to understand, because they accepted this
propaganda without giving it a second thought or question if anything like that
was possible. As far as I know about medicine, there is no way to tell the gender
of a child, to determine the gender of a child in advance, especially not by
injection.
Q. And this sort of type of propaganda, what effect was it having on the non-Serb
population?
A. We lived in great fear.
Q. Now, did you notice an increase in the carrying of weapons?
A. In the town of Prijedor itself, there was an enormous amount of armed persons
in the streets, in the cafes, all over the place.
Q. Those armed persons, were those members of the military, the regular JNA?
A. They wore the uniforms and insignia of the then regular JNA, but there were
armed people in the -- wearing police uniforms, the police that was then referred
to as "Milicija".
Q. The increase in armed persons, was that true of all ethnicities?
A. Mostly armed people walking around were Serbs.
Q. And did you speak to any of the Serbs that you knew about why they were
carrying arms?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what explanation did you get?
A. The most frequent explanation was that they only wanted to successfully
defend Yugoslavia and for all Serbs to live within one state, and that they would
never allow that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to become Croatian, Ustasha soil, or
a dzemaharija, which was a derogatory name they used for a state in which
Muslims would live and be in power, something like that.
Q. Whilst these villages were being attacked, did you hear announcements or
what Prijedor Radio was broadcasting?
A. This was, again, a typical propaganda. They boasted of great successes of the
Serb army, and they kept saying that an Ustasha fundamentalist stronghold had
fallen, and that a large number of Ustashas and Green Berets had been liquidated
and so on.
Q. When these announcements were being made, did the radio say on whose
behalf those announcements were making, who was making those
announcements?
A. It was most frequently said that "on the behalf of the Crisis Staff," of the socalled Crisis Staff that was operating at the time.‖ (ICTY testimony transcript 1)
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The rest of his testimony details the brutal attacks which seemed to be the result of the described
propaganda. This propaganda demonstrated both the super-human and sub-human stages because
of the misinformation of the Croat and Bosniak doctors performing forced sterilizations on Serb
women and the use of derogatory references to Bosniaks and Croats.
Genocidal Rape
The specific and repeated use of rape as a genocidal action was commonplace in the
Balkans. Approximately 20,000-30,000 women and girls were raped in the Balkan war and
genocide with Serbian forces responsible for most (Von Joeden-Forgey 2010). While the main
stress in this case study is the Serbian use, rape was also used by Croats and Bosniaks though to
a lesser degree and was present at the Čelibići Camp where Serbs were interned (ICTY website).
Still, it is the systematic usage by Serbian forces which classified rape during the war as
genocidal. The massive scale and the intent show that rape was used to humiliate and destroy the
Bosniak identity. Allen (1996) quoted Guiseppe Zaccaria summarized notes from a Serb army
meeting in Belgrade (Card 2008):
―Our analysis of the behavior of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the
morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we
aim our action at the point where religious and social structure is most fragile.
We refer to the women, especially adolescents, and to the children. Decisive
intervention on these social figures would spread confusion among the
communities, thus causing first of all fear and then panic, leading to a probable
[Muslim] retreat from the territories involved in war activity‖ (Allen 1996, 57;
Card 2008, 176-7).
Bosniak women taken prisoner by the Serb army, militias, and Bosnian Serbs were
subjected to gang rape in the camps where they were held. Sometimes, while trying to flee,
women would be raped on the side of the road. Rape was used as a way of exerting control over
Muslim women and to eliminate the Bosniak population by spreading the Serb seed. Logically,
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the idea that Serbian men impregnating Bosniak women would lead to Serbian offspring makes
no sense. Weitsman (2008) questions this idea by pointing out that biologically the offspring
would be half Bosniak and half Serbian but wanted by no one. By trying to impregnate the
Bosniak women, Serbian men were exerting and demonstrating their power over them. Rape was
also used as a means of humiliation and a means to commit murder.
It should also be noted that there were occurrences of rape by coercion. Ranko Češić, a
member of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense was found guilty of ―forcing two brothers
detained at the Luka camp to perform fellatio on each other, at gunpoint, in the presence of
others‖ (ICTY website). The gendering of the power relationship between the Serb perpetrators
and the Bosniak and Croat victims was continually demonstrated through acts of rape. The
perpetrators viewed themselves and the victims, both men and women, were viewed by along
perceived gender roles. Serb perpetrators became the epitome of masculinity through
demonstration through rape and the perception as defenders of the Serb nationality and perceived
the Croat and Bosniak victims as weak, pliable, and less thus applying feminine qualities so that
the violence could continue.
Witness 50
Witness 50 was a Muslim prisoner at the Foča camp where gang rape, forced pregnancy
and maternity were commonplace (Weitsman 2008). Her testimony described instances of
continuous rape, humiliation, and the belief that ethnicity could be removed. Portions of her
testimony taken at the trial against Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, members of the Bosnian Serb
Army illustrating their activities are noted below. All three were convicted of torture, rape,
crimes against humanity, and enslavement (ICTY website). The use of her testimony here is to
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demonstrate the specific action and intention of rape as genocidal. Witness 50‘s testimony
highlights the attitudes of Serbs towards Bosniaks, as well the belief that the Bosniak ethnicity
could be removed easily through either informal compulsory baptism which allowed the
perpetrator to hold the power of a priest or rape whereby the woman‘s ethnicity could be
rewritten though forced maternity. It is important to note that Witness 50 does not necessarily
understand why this happened to her specifically, but she was aware that it was because she was
Muslim.
―I don't remember exactly what he said to me. They were all speaking and saying
the same things. Always they were saying, "You Muslim women, you Bule, we'll
show you," and that's what they said, all of them, the same things...
I think he asked where my father was, and I didn't know myself. They wanted to
get answers from me which I wasn't able to give. They would say, "Where is our
army," or things like that. There was no "our army," so it was impossible for me
to answer questions of that kind…
The next time was when I was taken to a house. The house was opposite the bus
stop in Foča, the bus station in Foča. There was only one bus station and
everybody knew it. A group of soldiers took me off, along with three other girls
from the Partizan Sports Hall. They took us into a house, which was -- how shall I
describe it? It was all ransacked, things all over the place. You could see that
nobody lived there. And the first thing they ordered us to do was to tidy the house
and they said they'd go off to see to some business and that they'd come back.
And as far as some cleaning things were concerned, we didn't get anything, but
we just had to make do and clear the place up. They went off, and when they
came back there were more of them. They were people that I hadn't known or
seen before that, and there were some of them who weren't from Foča at all. And
they raped us there. Each one of them raped the girl he wanted to rape, and as
many times as he wanted to rape her. Everybody would pick and choose. They
would say, "Come on, you." or "Let's go upstairs," because the house had rooms
on the ground floor and on the first floor. So we would be down there until they
took us off to rape us, to another room. And whenever they wanted to, they picked
the girl they wanted to and raped her. I think that I was raped there three times,
perhaps more. I can't remember exactly how many times, but it was dreadful.
They would take their turns, one after the other. They would have breaks of 15
minutes or maybe one hour, as long as they wanted, but there were terrible things
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going on there. There were old people there. They were dirty people and drunken
people, and they would take my friend off. He would rape her and then rape me.
But they did their best to rape all of us, that each one of them raped each one of us
in turn.
Q. How many different soldiers raped you that day?
A. Well, I said a moment ago that I counted up to three. All three of them were
different. I was raped three times by three different men, not by one person. But
they didn't pay any attention of how much my body could take. They did what
they wanted until absolute exhaustion. It was absolutely terrible…
I was raped by an acquaintance of mine, (redacted) (redacted). He knew me very
well. We took the same bus every day. He went to work and I went to school. And
he was certainly 20 years older than I. He was a married man.
Q. Did he say anything to you when he raped you?
A. It was terrible. He laughed. I had the feeling that he was doing this precisely
because he knew me, to inflict even more evil on me. I don't know exactly…
Yes. Yes. Another time a Serb took me to his mother's apartment -- his apartment
too -- also in Brod, but it's not the same apartment, it's not the same man, and it's
not even the same neighbourhood. Perhaps it's a kilometre away. He took me to
his mother's apartment, and he asked me to introduce myself as a Serb, to say that
my name was (redacted), to say that I was from Ustikolina, that -- I don't know -that my mother and father were also Serbs. And that's what I had to do. I kept
quiet all the time. He talked for me. He talked about some people from Ustikolina,
about these parents, who he said had to be mine during this night that I was
spending with him. We sat there for about two hours like that. They even brought
me some brandy to drink. I never drank alcohol, especially at that time, when I
wasn't even 17 years old. They knew that very well, that Muslim women did not
drink alcohol, for the most part. And he changed my name. He wanted me to be
his Serb girl that night. We sat for about two hours that way. He did the talking
most of the time; I kept quiet. There was no light at that apartment at the time. A
candle had been lit. He took me to his room. He raped me four hours, for sure, in
succession. Perhaps he made 15- or 20-minute breaks, whatever suited him. At
any rate, he was so terrible. He was so terrible. He did such things that I cannot
even explain them. I had no place to take a bath. I couldn't even wash my hands or
something like that…
Yes. The first time I was raped in that house, that's what I just described. That
happened in an upstairs room. However, the second time I was raped, now I
cannot remember whether this second person who raped me first took me to this
room upstairs. I think he did. Then since there were a lot of people and then these
other people were supposed to rape these other girls, he took me to this workshop
that I already described in my statement. It looked like a small room. It was
attached to the house, to the ground floor of the house, that is. Things were
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scattered all around inside as well. I went down there with him. I think that he
belonged to some of these other brigades, these brigades from Montenegro or
something like that. I could reach that conclusion on the basis of his accent, the
way he spoke. It was different from Bosnian. He was old. He was awful. He had a
knife. He said to me, "You will see, you Muslim. I am going to draw a cross on
your back. I'm going to baptise all of you. You're now going to be Serbs." And
many things I could not possibly describe today. He threatened me so much with
the knife that I thought I would lose my life any minute. However, he decided to
rape me after all, in a beast-like manner. He raped me so hard that later I saw that
I was bleeding, and everything hurt me: my stomach, my back, my legs;
everything ached. What hurt me most of all was that he was certainly some 30
years older than I was. He was probably my father's age…‖ (ICTY testimony
transcript 2)
The use of derogatory terms such as ‗Bule‘ and the repeated use of rape to remove the
Bosniak ethnicity and to impregnate demonstrated the Serb belief that Bosniaks were considered
less.
Androcide at Srebrenica
In 1993, two years after the war began, six cities in Bosnia that had been under siege by
the Serbs were deemed ‗safe areas‘ by the UN, one being Srebrenica. The reason can only be
speculated as to why troops and funds were not committed to make sure these ‗safe areas‘ would
remain safe (LeBor 2006). Approximately four hundred Dutch peacekeepers guarded an
overcrowded city of Bosniaks trying to avoid being captured and killed (Jones 2006). Still, it
seemed that the UN under the leadership of Boutros-Ghali was more interested in preserving
neutrality. The UN special representative to the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, was known
to meet with the Serbian leader Milosevic on a regular basis and even joked with Milosevic
regarding UN Safe Areas referring to them as ―safe areas for animals‖ and believing the Serb
propaganda blaming the Bosniaks for the war (LeBor 2006, 112). Power quoted Akashi, ―The
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[Muslim Army] initiates actions and then calls on the UN and international community to
respond and take care of their faulty judgment‖ (2002, 398).
Starting July 8, 1995, the Bosnian Serb Army began shelling Srebrenica. By July 11th, the
Srebrenica safe area fell to the Bosnian Serb militia uncontested. Dutch soldiers were even
captured in a photograph drinking with Gen. Mladic (Power 2002). Over the next few days, the
able-bodied boys and men were separated from the women, putting them on buses in opposite
directions. While the women were forcibly relocated to Tuzla, the men were brought to fields
where they were executed. The numbers are inconclusive, but it is estimated that about eight
thousand men and boys were executed. Besides a few witness accounts, satellite pictures of
―recently disturbed earth‖ were the only evidence that the massacre took place (LeBor 2006,
113).
Witness O and Other Witness Accounts
The below testimony was taken from the ICTY proceedings against Krstic, one of those
responsible for the androcide at Srebrenica. Witness O was a male Bosniak who had been at
Srebrenica.
―On the 13th of July, after heavy shelling throughout the night, many people were
killed. There was general confusion. We didn't know where to go. There was a big
forest, and about 10.00 a loudspeaker was heard. Probably, I assume, they were
Bosnian Serb soldiers, saying that we should surrender, otherwise we would all be
killed and the shelling would continue, and that we would be treated in
accordance with all the Geneva Conventions, they said.[…]
When we got closer, I saw that there were tanks and some other weapons on
wheels. I don't know what kind. The column was continuous, and then I realised
that we had surrendered. When I got close to the bridge, there were five or six, or
maybe four or seven -- I don't know -- soldiers, roughly, there, and they said -- the
column was moving and they were talking, and they were saying, "Come on." I
had a bag. One of the soldiers asked me, "What do you have in your bag? Do you
have any weapons or German marks or something?" I said I didn't. They told us to
put our bags aside, our weapons, to lay down our weapons and any sharp objects.
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But I didn't see anyone with weapons. I think no one had weapons. And they told
us that everything would be returned to us.[…]
While I was standing in a line, we had to raise our arms as soon as we left our
bags. Very close to me there was a tank, and one or two weapons on wheels with
some sort of machine-guns or something; I don't know exactly. And on the tank,
in white letters, the words "queen of death" was written. I think it was in Cyrillic,
but I can't be a hundred per cent sure. And next to the river -- again I can't tell you
the exact number of soldiers; ten, maybe fewer, who had their guns pointed at us.
There were soldiers walking past us, asking for money, and when everyone
handed everything over, they cursed our balija mothers, "Balija son, we'll show
you," and things like that. Almost everyone, each one of them, made these
demands. I remember one in particular who had a machine-gun and an
ammunition belt which was almost down to the ground.[…]So as we ran, we had
to lift three fingers, and the soldiers were running alongside, with rifles. And I
think the drivers in the bus and the trucks were armed with weapons, but I'm not
sure of that. I can't say for sure. I thought they were. Behind me a Bosnian Serb
soldier asked the man behind me -- I couldn't see who he was. I don't know what
he looks like. Whether he was young or old, I don't know. He asked him, "Which
unit were you in Srebrenica?" He was probably referring to the army. The man
said, "I was in an infantry unit." I don't know why he said that. It sounds ironic.
An execution unit, actually…
Then the blows started. I don't know whether he stayed there or continued
running. I don't know.
As we turned to the left, I saw a dead man. He wasn't run over, because the cars
were only using one lane, but he must have been killed much earlier, because
there were flies all over him and worms. He seemed to me to be like an older
man, but I can't say for sure. Then we turned left, running all the time. We were
carrying the wounded, I, among others. We took turns. I don't know whether we,
all of us, left the place where we had stood, where we had surrendered. And the
place where we turned was on a meadow above the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road.
The grass was quite high, but it had been stamped on as if people had been there
before. I just remember that, that it wasn't standing up, the grass […]
As we were getting off the truck people had to step on each other. I saw a relative
of mine, an acquaintance, on whom people had to step. I don't know whether he
was still conscious, but people were walking on top of him, because he couldn't
stand up. But later on I saw him in the classroom. He was there. I don't know
whether it was really a classroom. I don't know what kind of building it was,
actually.
[…]Actually, there was the man in front of me, a man who was captured. I don't
know who he was. And he was waiting for his turn to come to receive a blow.
And the Bosnian Serb soldier asked him, "Do you know me?" And the man said,
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"Yes, I know you, brother." He said "brother." I don't know why. And the Serb
soldier answered, "Who do you know?" He asked the man, "Who do you know,"
as if he didn't want him to know him. And as he was holding a gun -- I think it
was one with a clip, a large clip. I don't know whether it was an automatic rifle,
but something like that. I think all the soldiers had automatic rifles. I think so.
Machine-guns or automatic rifles. And when the man said he knew him, the Serb
soldier hit him with his rifle. He hit him with the front part of the rifle, in his ribs,
in his stomach. The man curled up, or rather he screamed, but the man who was in
front of the door, I don't know whether he approached him, but as he bent down,
as this man bent down, this other one hit him with his rifle butt across the back,
once or twice; I don't know. But when he saw that there was no point, that he
would continue to be beaten, he sort of stood up and entered the school. I don't
know whether they broke him anything.[…]
And then, when darkness fell, from the other classrooms -- I assume it was from
the other classrooms, because as I was entering I heard people talking in the other
classrooms. Somebody in the corridor was saying something, probably one of the
soldiers. He was saying, "Let three balijas come out." Was it three or four or five
or two, I can't remember all the numbers. And while the people got down in front
of the school, bursts of fire could be heard. And this was repeated every time.
When he would say three or four or five men were to come out, they were taken
in front of the school and shots were heard. I assume that the shooting was in
front of the school, because it was so loud. And they went on like that until
perhaps midnight. Perhaps it was midnight. I'm not quite sure. But anyway, it was
very late.[…]
And the bursts of gunfire continued and the people fell down. I don't know how
long it took. They kept bringing people up. I remember that elderly man, I
assumed that he was an old man. And after that finished, I don't know how long it
lasted; maybe one hour, or maybe ten minutes. But it all, to me, it all looked very
long. The next group who was -- that was probably taken out after me was also
shot at. And at that point, I felt a sudden sharp pain in my left leg. I thought that a
bullet had hit me in my left foot. And I thought that bullets were hitting the gravel
around me. They were firing in bursts of gunfire, and I was simply expecting the
next bullet to come and hit me. But the gravel kept falling on me. I don't know
how long it took them. I don't know how many rows of people there were left. But
when they had finished, they laughed. They said, "Well, your government will be
exchanging you even if you're dead." They would take a look at someone and they
would make jokes, "Look at this guy, he looks like a cabbage." I don't know what
else they were saying‖ (ICTY testimony transcript 3)
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Many of the female survivors still do not know what happened to their husbands and sons. In
2004, Leydesdorff (2011) interviewed multiple female survivors. This account is of Sabaheta
Felić who lost her husband, Šaban Felić, and son, Rijad Felić.
―On July 11 at around five in the afternoon, my son and I arrived in Potočari.
There were already a lot of people there. The night of July 11-12 my son and I
slept in the open air, although I tried to get into the covered part of the compound.
[…] On Jule 12 at 10 [o‘clock] we were turned over to the Chetniks. The Chetniks
immediately began walking around, pointing to the men: ―You, you, you.‖ And
they took them with them, supposedly to question them, and said they would be
brought back after that. But they never did. […]
When the deportations began, we hear a rumor that they were going to separate
the men and the children [boys] without regard to age. It was a large site ─a
factory complex, an industrial zone─ and it was now full of women, children and
men who had been driven out of Srebrenica and were waiting to be deported. […]
I took his arm and we began to walk. We passed the line of Dutch soldiers and
immediately I saw that the Chetniks were standing in a row along the street. A
hundred or 200 meters farther up, the buses and trucks stood ready for the
deportation. My son and I went slowly, arm in arm; 50 meters behind us were
other people and in front of us were people, two by two in a row. When we came
to the Chetniks, they said immediately that my son had to go to the right and I had
to go straight on. We didn‘t listen, we kept walking straight ahead together. But
that wasn‘t good; they followed us immediately and said that he had to go right
and I had to go straight on. I didn‘t want that [but] they grabbed him. I pulled him
to me, and they pulled away… I begged them to let him go: ―Please don‘t do this,
he is my only child, he hasn‘t hurt anybody; if anybody is guilty, it‘s me ─take
me.‖ They cursed and pushed me, … they hit me, I couldn‘t do anything. They
were stronger and armed, and so they took my child. […] They began to yell,
scream, curse me, curse my Muslim mother, Alija Izetbegović [the Bosnian
leader]… They told me to go away and that they would bring my child back, that
they only wanted to question him. I said to them, ―If you are going to give him
back, then give him back now. I won‘t leave; if you won‘t give him back, then kill
me.‖ One of them took a gun and pointed it at me, but another one told him not to
kill me.
My life stopped in 1995 when I realized that my son and husband were not
coming back. Since then, I am a robot that gives itself orders‖ (Leydesdorff 2011,
2-5).
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The Balkan genocides do fit within the parameters of the ‗Three Switches‘ theory
(Hiebert 2008). The first stage of the formation of the ‗Other‘ was slowly reached over a period
of hundreds of years due to the influence of historical events over memory. In this case, no one
group was singularly considered the ‗Other‘. Instead, because of the multiplicity of the groups,
the dichotomy was constructed so that one group, the Serbs for instance, would be the in-group
and all others, Croats, Bosniaks and Kosovars, would be the out-group, and beginning in 1987,
relations and associations between the groups began to disintegrate. This occurred with each of
the major ethnic groups, but the switch is most obvious with the Serbs.
The super-human and sub-human switches occurred simultaneously and rotated back and
forth during the six years prior to the beginning of violent conflict in 1992. The rotating of the
super-human and sub-human stages created a death spiral where the exaggerated responsibility
was assigned and then the enemy became perceived as less. This idea of the rotating of the stages
demonstrates Hiebert‘s (2008) claim that the switches do not necessarily follow a straight line
temporally in every instance of genocide and many times overlap one another. As a part of the
super-human stage, Serb leadership through the use of propaganda continually pressed upon the
Serb population Croat collaboration with Nazi Germany and Bosniaks/Kosovars as the enemy in
the Kosovo Polje assigning an exaggerated responsibility and guilt to the groups. As the violence
escalated, Serb leaders accused Croats and Bosniaks of inventing attacks and numbers of the
dead to gain the sympathy of the global community (Neuffer 2001). This stood to paint the
Croats and Bosniaks as an enemy who would do anything to win the war thus assigning an
almost super-human quality to them. When the Serbs turned their attention towards Kosovo,
increasing Kosovar population numbers were used to imply a plot to expel Serbs from Kosovo
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(Power 2002). As the sub-human stage was reached, the perception of Bosniaks and Croats by
Serbs shifted from fear to hatred. Isolation and non-interaction led to minor pre-genocidal
violence where Bosniak businesses in primarily Serb areas would be broken into and destroyed.
This pre-genocidal violence was used as a way to intimidate with the hope of expelling the
Bosniak enemy.
This case study also fits within the theory of power being gendered and racialized. This
can be seen through the use of such genocidal tools as genocidal rape which had a double intent
of eliminating Bosniak/Croat and Kosovar ethnicities and of compelling their submission in
essence feminizing the Bosniaks/Croats and Kosovar. Through the purposeful slaughter of men
as described in the Srebrenica androcide, Bosniaks as a target group were literally feminized, and
the propaganda was used to distort and racialize the power relationship between the Serbs and
Bosniaks/Croats and Kosovars exploiting and exaggerating the imagined difference between
them.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE STUDY II: 1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE
The ethnic identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were rooted in economic divisions of precolonial Rwanda, but through the use of identification cards by Belgian colonists, these divisions
became racial in nature by focusing on skin color, height, and nose shape. The Belgian colonists
valued the Tutsi due to racial reasons and reinforced their ruling class status. Beginning in 1959
prior to independence, tensions began to mount between the two main group identities of Tutsi
and Hutu resulting in an almost forty year cycle of violence culminating in the 1994 genocide
which left approximately 800,000 people dead (Melvern 2004).
Making Identities: Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, and the Belgians
Ethnic division in Rwanda was artificially constructed by German colonizers in the late
nineteenth century and Belgian colonizers after World War I. Prior to colonial rule the divide
was along mainly economic and cultural lines. The Tutsis were the wealthy class, and the Hutus
were the commoners. The Tutsis owned land while the Hutus worked on it. The colonizers,
especially Belgium, saw the classes as a racial and ethnic hierarchy.
―They believed Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa were three distinct, long-existent and
internally coherent blocks of people, the local representatives of three major
population groups, the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid. Unclear whether these were
races, tribes, or language groups, the Europeans were nonetheless certain that the
Tutsi were superior to the Hutu and the Hutu superior to the Twa—just as they
knew themselves to be superior to all three‖ (DesForges 1999, HRW website).

When the Belgians took control of the colony, they implemented an identification system
requiring Rwandans to carry identity cards listing ethnicities, thus forcing Rwandans to declare
an ethnic identity. Certain physical characteristics such as height and skin color were used to
deem whether a person was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Capitalizing on this notion of Tutsi superiority
59

constructed by the Belgium colonists, Tutsi political leaders wrote an altered history that put
Tutsis in a better light and portrayed them as the conquerors over the less intelligent Hutu and
Twa peoples (DesForges 1999). The manipulation of history began to be accepted, and the Hutu,
Tutsi, and Twa became perceived as ethnicities instead of economic classes. This new ethnic
struggle was deeply entrenched in jealousy and hatred. The perception of Hutu was that the Tutsi
were unfairly elevated to power positions within the colonial government and rebelled after the
Tutsi King died in 1959 under mysterious circumstances (Melvern 2004).
A History of Violence
After the king died, the remnants of the Tutsi monarchy tried to eliminate the Hutu
leadership in an effort maintain power, but this ended up backfiring when the Hutu leadership
began targeting Tutsis. Belgian colonial authorities sided with the Hutus and began to remove
Tutsis from positions of power (Melvern 2004). Between 1959 and 1962, approximately 2,000
people predominately Tutsi had been killed with hundreds of thousands more fleeing across the
borders of Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and the DRC (McDoom 2010; Melvern 2004). Rwanda
became an independent republic in 1962 under the leadership of Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda. In
1962, a failed attempt by the refugee Tutsi to overthrow Kayibanda‘s government gave rise to
rumors of Tutsi plots to seize power resulting in further violence toward Tutsis, and during this
genocide the term Inyenzi or ‗cockroaches‘ was first used to describe Tutsi (Melvern 2004).
Approximately ten years later in neighboring Burundi, a separate genocide occurred. At
the time, the Burundi government was controlled by upper-class Tutsi, and in April 1972, a
violent Hutu uprising began which resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,000 Tutsi
(Lemarchand 2009). The Burundi government‘s response was swift and far-reaching with an
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estimated 150,000-200,000 Hutus murdered (Lemarchand 2009; Melvern 2004). ―Kayibanda
used the tragic events in Burundi to conduct a further crackdown against the Tutsi in Rwanda
and started a campaign to ‗purify‘ the country‖ resulting in more Tutsi deaths and emigration
(Melvern 2004, 10). In 1973, a military coup took place ousting Kayibanda from power, and
Juvénal Habyarimana took control. Habyarimana turned Rwanda into a one-party state system
under the control of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND).
Oddly, his installment as president ended the violence against the Tutsi in Rwanda, but the legal
and political exclusion and isolation of Tutsis began to the extent that Melvern (2004) called it an
―apartheid regime‖ (12):
―There were no Tutsi prefects or bourgmestres, only one Tutsi minister, two Tutsi
members of parliament, out of 70, and one Tutsi officer in the army. There were
quotas established in schools and government service to limit the numbers of
Tutsi to ten percent. There was only token Tutsi representation throughout
government‖ (Melvern 2004, 12).

With the use of the identity cards, the political apartheid was easily implemented, but on a social
level, integration and intermarriage between Tutsi and Hutu were common.
In late 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) comprised of second-generation
Rwandan Tutsi refugees whose parents had been forced into exile by the violence in 1959-63
invaded Rwanda. It is of note that at the time, the UNHCR had found that there were
approximately 900,000 Rwandan refugees living outside of Rwanda, and with the majority being
Tutsi, they were not allowed re-entry because of the government‘s claim of over-crowding
(Melvern 2004). Even though the initial invasion was a failure, it eventually led to a civil war
that further divided Rwanda along ethnic lines. At the same time, support for Habyarimana‘s
regime began to fragment leading to descent from the more radical elements. The result of this
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fragmentation was the establishment of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR).
―[The CDR] promoted the most anti-Tutsi policies and banned from its membership anyone with
Tutsi grandparents‖ (Melvern 2004, 51). The Interahamwe initially emerged as youth group, and
the members were given military training and were present in sectors across Rwanda. The civil
war continued until 1993 when the RPF under the leadership of Paul Kagame entered into
negotiations with Habyarimana‘s MRND regime known as the Arusha Accords. As the Arusha
Accords were being negotiated, propaganda calling into question the reliability of Tutsi
neighbors spread throughout Rwanda through a new media outlet Radio-Télévision Libre des
Milles Collines. All Tutsi were suspect in collaborating with the RPF or at least that was what
permeated the airwaves. Also in 1993, Rwanda saw a substantial increase in imports of machetes
and agricultural tools:
―The total number of machetes imported in 1993 weighed 581,175 kilos and cost
US$725,699: there was an estimated one new machete for every third male in the
country‖ (Melvern 2004, 56).

As the Arusha Accords were being agreed to, Interahamwe and others who had access to the
government‘s imports were arming themselves for what would come next.
It should be noted that the United Nations already had approximately 2,500 peacekeepers
commanded by Major General Roméo Dallaire constituting the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in order to monitor the ceasefire as mandated by the Arusha
Accords (Jones 2006).
April 6, 1994
On the evening of April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana and the president of
Burundi was shot down as it descended into Kigali. No decisive answer has been found as to
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who was responsible for the assassination. Multiple theories have been introduced with some
focusing on the RPF as culprits, but Melvern‘s (2004) theory that Habyarimana‘s plane was shot
down by CDR members in order to trigger the massacre of Tutsi has been one of the most
accepted. No matter who was responsible, the assassination signified the beginning of the
genocide. The violence was sparse in the first few hours taking aim at political opponents
including Prime Minister Uwimiliyana. The quickness in the escalation of violence showed that
the Interahamwe were organized and already armed, but many citizens, primarily Tutsi, were not
aware of what was happening. This made the genocide appear frenzied and manic. The army and
Interahamwe would go from house to house searching for Tutsi and set up roadblocks to stop any
Tutsi fleeing the core of the violence and dispatch them. Concurrently, most of the sector centers
erupted in violence, and within the first two weeks, thousands of Tutsis were slaughtered.
Dallaire and the remaining UNAMIR peacekeepers could only look on in horror since
they had been ordered not to interfere (Jones 2006; Melvern 2004; Power 2002). Dallaire had
been insistent in asking for more support, militarily and monetarily, but the UN refused him in
every instance. The RPF began advancing to counter the Interahamwe and Rwandan army
onslaught. The violence continued until July when the interim government evacuated to Goma,
Zaire. In that three month period, approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.
To clarify, moderate Hutu were political opponents, Hutus who had been deemed traitorous, or
victims of personal vendettas.
Propaganda
Much of the extremist Hutu propaganda was transmitted through audio, RTLM and
Radio Rwanda and print, Kangura, media. These outlets were primarily funded by the CDR and
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thus became the primary way to spread their belief in Hutu power. Tutsis were commonly
referred to as inyenzi, cockroaches. Tutsi women were portrayed as overtly sexualized and
temptresses who could hold sway over Hutu men, if allowed (Jones 2006). The first
commandment of the ―Ten Commandments of the Hutu‖ made specific reference to Tutsi
women:
―Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the
interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any
Hutu who: marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi woman; employs a Tutsi
woman as secretary or concubine‖ (Power 2002, 338).

Still, the stereotypical tall, slim and beautiful Tutsi woman was the considered the ideal of
beauty and superior to the Hutu. The propaganda played upon their envy and hatred for what was
believed to be superior (Jones 2002).
The transcripts of the RTLM broadcasts were used in UNICTR trials as evidence, but
only a few were translated into English. Most are still in the original Kinyarwanda. The
translated English transcripts available have demonstrated hatred toward Tutsis making little to
no distinctions between RPF, civilians in Rwanda, and refugees. Tutsis were painted as seeking
power by whatever means necessary since their power was stripped in 1959. Broadcasts gave the
appearance of legitimacy through interviews and sparse news reports, but real news reports were
intermingled with false ones. In one RTLM broadcast on 12/12/93, Jean-Bosca Barayagwiza
leader of CDR was interviewed and participated in a discussion regarding whether the ethnicities
of Hutu and Tutsi actually existed. The below excerpt is from the end of the discussion:
―The RPF claim that they are representing the Tutsis, but they deny that the Tutsis
are in the minority. They are 9% of the population. The Hutus make up 80%! So
their conclusion is: ‗If we accepted that we are Tutsis and accepted the rules of
democracy, and went to the polls, the Hutus will always have the upper hand and
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we shall never rule‘. Look at what happened in Burundi: they also thought like
that. Those who staged the coup d‘état thought in the same way. Their mentality
is like that of the Inyenzi, whose only target is power, yet they know very well
that today, it is unacceptable to attain power without going through the
democratic process. …(inaudible)… They wonder: ‗How shall we go about
acceding to power?‘, and they add: ‗The best way is to refute the existence of
ethnic groups, so that when we are in power, nobody will say that it is a single
ethnic group that is in power‘. That is the problem we are facing now‖ (UNICTR
RTLM transcript, English trans. 12/12/93).

In the months prior to his assassination, rumors were persistent that an attempt on
Habyarimana‘s life would be imminent. RTLM put forth the notion that there may be a coup
d‘état by the moderate prime minister. This had the intent of questioning her loyalty but also to
make the RPF and Tutsis in general into the ‗unseen enemy‘ increasing paranoia and fear. Below
is another excerpt from RTLM questioning Prime Minister Agathe Uwimiliyana‘s allegiance to
President Habyarimana by RTLM journalist Valérie Bemeriki:
―[…] Regarding the information you received yesterday, regarding the knife
found on Antoine Misago, CDR 2nd vice-chairman; the party was to be received
by Agathe. That happened on Thursday. Radio Rwanda did not announce that;
however, Radio Muhabura broadcast it on Friday, very early in the morning. The
radio station reported the knife incident. They thus launched a bitter attack against
an RTLM presenter named Noël Hitimana. Radio Muhabura reported the incident
and other radio stations reported it to the entire world. Apparently, the man had a
long knife, very long, he wanted to use it to attack Agathe.
Radio Muhabura aired the report; but Radio Rwanda did not. You will recall that
Radio Rwanda mentioned it much later, but it was first broadcast on Radio
Muhabura. That shows that Agathe collaborates with Radio Muhabura. But this
report was totally fabricated with the sole aim of tarnishing the CDR‘s image, to
show that, in reality, the CDR is a party of murderers and should not be included
in the Broad-Based Transitional Government.
You heard Antoine Misago‘s explanations; he said that he came with a knife but
did so inadvertently. Also, if this story is true, as it happened Thursday, Agathe
should have invited Rwandan television – since it begins its broadcasts on Friday
– to film the knife, and show the footage to everyone on television. Why was she
afraid to invite the television crew? That means that, in reality, these are lies. This
knife cannot be used to carry out an assassination, as its owner claims; rather, he
uses the knife when he travels.
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That‘s not all. You have noticed that the statements made lately on Radio Rwanda
are full of contradiction, that in reality, she is conniving with the RPF. We
understand the RPF is bent on creating divisions in our country, to cause unrest
and kill people. This will affect the civilian population especially given that the
RPF‘s plan is to divide the armed forces in order to overthrow Juvénal
Habyarimana‘s regime.
[…] People should mobilize against this woman…‖ (UNICTR RTLM transcript,
English trans. 4/3/94).

Another excerpt from RTLM after the genocide began in which the announcer defends Hutu
actions:
―And yet it is we, the Hutus, who are armed with machetes and cudgels in order to
prevent our annihilation; we are considered wrong. We are the villains. Let them
go ahead [with] their enquiries, but not in our country, so long as they are not
aimed at identifying the persons who assassinated His Excellency, the President
of the Republic, those who caused us so much pain and plunged us into darkness.
They will not catch us napping again. […]
However, the American President will be astonished when he hears the truth
about the Hutus in Rwanda and realizes that they represent 90% of the population,
I believe he will be astonished. This is how often we fall victim to things we do
not know. There is the story of a Hutu who went to serve a nobleman with Tutsi
companions. One day he was asked blow on the fire during a vigil. But when he
bent down to do so, the others exchanged signs as if to say: ‗Look at this fool who
is blowing on the fire‘. Later, he spoke, but he realize that nobody was paying
attention to what he had to say. Once he understood what had happened he said to
himself: ‗I am in a tight spot‘. Therefore, we too must understand what we are
victims of. The Tutsi groups have sold us with the assistance of American crooks.
We do hope that when the President of the United States realizes that they want to
exterminate the Hutus, he will stop listening to them (UNICTR RTLM transcript,
English trans. 5/17/94).
The propaganda pointedly was used to distort events, minimizing Hutu responsibility and
maximizing Tutsi fault in order to galvanize support.
Genocidal Rape
In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Tutsi and moderate Hutu men and women were raped as
a way to humiliate and remove the sex through mutilation. Each of the intentions was involved,
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but the scale on which the rapes took place exceeded that of any previous modern account with
an estimate of 250,000 to 500,000 rapes during the first 12 weeks of the genocide (Jones 2002).
Tutsi women were mutilated by having their breasts, noses, and fingers cut off before being
murdered since these body parts characterized them as Tutsi. The use of systematic rape was a
way to rewrite the ‗Tutsi-ness‘ of the women through mutilation and forced pregnancies. Women
were raped by such frequency by multiple perpetrators and maliciousness that many were left
unable to carry a child to term. The women who managed to survive carry the physical as well as
emotional scars of the genocide. Adam Jones gives the account of Elenor Richter-Lyonette:
―Again and again, rape is reported as an act of extreme brutality. Objects are said
to have been used to cause extra pain, and rapes with objects are said to include
among others rapes with stones, with branches from trees of bushes, with
weapons. Rape accompanied by mutilation is reported to include: the pouring of
boiling water onto the genital parts and into the vagina in order to create pain and
ordeal, the opening of the womb to cut out the unborn child before the killing of
the mother, the cutting off of breast(s) and the mutilation of other parts of the
female body‖ (2002, 81).

Rape, as a tool of genocide, was used by the Hutus to destroy the Tutsi women. It was used as a
way to physically hurt and humiliate their victims. Accounts exist of mutilation and rape by use
of objects such as machetes and spears. Weitsman (2008) interviewed survivors of rape; one
described her experience being mutilated:
―He then took her inside, put her on a bed, and held one leg open, while another
held her other leg. ―He called everyone who was outside and said, ‗you come and
see how Tutsikazi are on the inside.‘ Then he cut out the inside of my vagina. He
took the flesh outside, took a small stick and put what he had cut on the top. He
stuck the stick in the ground outside the door and was shouting, ‗Everyone who
comes past here will see how Tutsikazi look‘‖ (Weitsman 2008, 575-6).
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De Brouwer and Ka Hon Chu (2009) collected survivor stories for the edited volume, The Men
Who Killed Me: Rwandan Survivors of Sexual Violence. These testimonials detail the
experiences of sixteen women and one man during the 1994 genocide. The first excerpt from the
testimonials below is from Françoise Mukeshimana. It should also be noted that many of the
survivors interviewed for the volume were later diagnosed as HIV positive as a result of being
raped during the genocide.
―[…] My father went to a roadblock and asked the Interahamwe there to kill him.
The Interahamwe said he was a snake, and with their machetes they cut him on
the neck and legs. My father, who was a tall man, was forced to go down on his
knees. That was the Interahamwe‘s way of cutting him down. My father died at
that roadblock. We could see all of this, because the roadblock was not far from
where we were.
Back at the grave, the Interahamwe hit my brother with a huge club and told him
to look at his sister for the last time. As he looked at me, he begged them to kill
me first, because he feared that I would die of pain. Instead, they continued to
bash him, until he died looking into my eyes.
The Interahamwe then proceeded to discuss how they would kill me. One of them
argued that it would be a great mistake if they killed me without humiliating me
first. He said that they should strip me naked and do to me all that they wanted, in
order to tell others that they had been thorough in carrying out their ‗work.‘ I was
nothing but an instrument of gratification for them. The men ordered me to
undress, and I could do nothing but obey. After that, they asked me if I still
refused to have sex with them. Tears burned my eyes, and I started weeping. They
laughed at me, saying that there was no one left to hear my cries and no one to
stand with me. They ordered me to lie down, and a man I had refused to date
before the genocide raped me first. After he was finished, another raped me, and
another and another, until I did not have the courage to keep count.
These men were so sadistic that they tried to cut my vagina into two parts with a
sword in order to share me. I still have the deep scars on my pelvis today. I was
bleeding so profusely that the next man about to rape me did not do it, saying that
I was disgusting. All of this happened during the daytime, in front of the bar.
Many Interahamwe were watching, dancing and laughing at me. The whole time,
I felt nothing. I thought I was going to die…‖ (de Brouwer 2009, 101-2).
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Akayesu Decision
The conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu was a landmark decision in establishing rape as
genocidal. This case specifically dealt with the systematic rape of Tutsi women in the Taba
district but had legal ramifications in defining the status of rape within genocide since the
allegation of rape was included with the charge of genocide (ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para.
6). Specific acts were labeled as genocide:
―In this indictment, acts of sexual violence include forcible sexual penetration of
the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis and/or of the vagina or anus by some
other object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity‖ (ICTR Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, para.10A).
Charges specifically addressed rape as a means to instill fear and cause humiliation:
―While seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female displaced civilians were
regularly taken by armed local militia and/or communal police and subjected to
sexual violence, and/or beaten on or near the bureau communal premises.
Displaced civilians were also murdered frequently on or near the bureau
communal premises. Many women were forced to endure multiple acts of sexual
violence which were at times committed by more than one assailant. These acts of
sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily
harm. The female displaced civilians lived in constant fear and their physical and
psychological health deteriorated as a result of the sexual violence and beatings
and killings‖ (ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paragraph 12A).
Witness testimonies during the trial were explicit and were summarized in the judgment:
―Witness JJ testified that often the Interahamwe came to beat the refugees during
the day, and that the policemen came to beat them at night. She also testified that
the Interahamwe took young girls and women from their site of refuge near the
bureau communal into a forest in the area and raped them. Witness JJ testified
that this happened to her - that she was stripped of her clothing and raped in front
of other people. At the request of the Prosecutor and with great embarrassment,
she explicitly specified that therapist, a young man armed with an axe and a long
knife, penetrated her vagina with his penis. She stated that on this occasion she
was raped twice. Subsequently, she told the Chamber, on a day when it was
raining, she was taken by force from near the bureau communal into the cultural
center within the compound of the bureau communal, in a group of approximately
fifteen girls and women. In the cultural center, according to Witness JJ, they were
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raped. She was raped twice by one man. Then another man came to where she
was lying and he also raped her. A third man then raped her, she said, at which
point she described herself as feeling near dead. Witness JJ testified that she was
at a later time dragged back to the cultural center in a group of approximately ten
girls and women and they were raped. She was raped again, two times. Witness JJ
testified that she could not count the total number of times she was raped. She
said, "each time you encountered attackers they would rape you," - in the forest,
in the sorghum fields. Witness JJ related to the Chamber the experience of finding
her sister before she died, having been raped and cut with a machete‖ (ICTR
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 421).
―Witness KK also recalled seeing women and girls selected and taken away to the
cultural center at the bureau communal by Interahamwes who said they were
going to "sleep with" these women and girls. Witness KK testified regarding an
incident in which the Accused told the Interahamwe to undress a young girl
named Chantal, whom he knew to be a gymnast, so that she could do gymnastics
naked. The Accused told Chantal, who said she was Hutu, that she must be a Tutsi
because he knew her father to be a Tutsi. As Chantal was forced to march around
naked in front of many people, Witness KK testified that the Accused was
laughing and happy with this. Afterwards, she said he told the Interahamwes to
take her away and said "you should first of all make sure that you sleep with this
girl." (Ngo kandi nababwiye ko muzajya mubanza mukirwanaho mukarongora
abo bakobwa.) Witness KK also testified regarding the rape of Tutsi women
married to Hutu men. She described, after leaving the bureau communal,
encountering on the road a man and woman who had been killed. She said the
woman, whom she knew to be a Tutsi married to a Hutu, was "not exactly dead"
and still in agony. She described the Interahamwes forcing a piece of wood into
the woman's sexual organs while she was still breathing, before she died. In most
cases, Witness KK said that Tutsi women married to Hutu men "were left alone
because it was said that these women deliver Hutu children." She said that there
were Hutu men who married Tutsi women to save them, but that these women
were sought, taken away forcibly and killed. She said that she never saw the
Accused rape a woman‖ (ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 429).
The excerpts from testimonies highlight the intent of genocidal rape to intimidate and remove the
ability for Tutsi women to have Tutsi children. The hatred and jealousy of Tutsi women was
apparent in the testimonies, and this combination led to horrific mutilation and torture.
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Androcide
Since the 1994 genocide escalated so quickly, it is difficult to point out circumstances
where a specific gender was targeted for elimination. Still, testimonials and reports suggest that
men and boys were more actively targeted for extermination especially in the first two weeks of
the genocide. Jones (2002) recounted the testimonial of Catherine Kanyundo:
―They took all the men and boys, everyone masculine from about the age of two.
Any boy who could walk was taken. They put them on one side. They were
particularly interested in men who looked like students, civil servants, in short any
man who looked as if he had education or money. They left only very poor men,
those who were already wounded and tiny babies. Not even the very old were
spared. They were all killed with machetes, spears and swords. They were killed
nearby” (72).
Tutsi men were targeted because of their perceived elevated status, while Tutsi boys were
targeted because of their potentiality to grow up and become part of the RPF. This fear and
hatred of men as a potential threat gives credence to the claim of androcide in the 1994 genocide.
In order to protect their sons and husbands from being killed, women began dressing them in
women‘s clothes. The below testimonial from Marie Claire Uwera illustrates the androcide.
―[…] On another occasion, I remember a Tutsi girl of about fourteen who was
taken from the commercial centre by an Interahamwe. I recognized him as one of
my neighbours. The girl told us that she was raped by more than ten Interahamwe
in one day. Every time she returned after being raped, they came looking for her
in order to rape her again. After she returned from being raped a third time, there
was blood streaming down her legs from her private parts. At this point she could
not walk any longer, and she had to use her hands to drag herself. She cried a lot
and did not say anything. As we were all waiting for death to come, we were not
able to care for her, or anyone else, for that matter.
On Tuesday, May 3, 1994, the Interahamwe detained my mother and forced her to
leave the commercial centre. I still remember this date so very well, since the
nearby market was open, and the market only opened on Tuesdays. I decided to
follow the Interahamwe with my two sons. We arrived at a big hole. There, my
mother‘s clothes were ripped off and she was raped by Interahamwe who were
not even twenty years old. Then one Interahamwe took a long sword and stuck it
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into my mother‘s belly. They also hit her with a club, and she fell in the hole. She
was killed while she was still naked.
I did not feel anything except fear. My older son cried. I begged them to kill me,
too. Though they beat me, they said they had no reason to kill me; they were not
in a rush, since they could kill me anytime they wanted. Instead, they killed my
older son, who was four years old, because, as a boy, he would have been able to
fight them after growing up. He was thrown into the same hole as my mother.
After the killing of my child, someone shouted that there were some cockroaches,
and the Interahamwe left us. I sat there for hours and hours, not feeling anything. I
wondered whether I was still a human being…‖ (de Brouwer 2009, 66-7).

Jones (2002) cited a specific account of androcide by the witness, Théodore
Nyilinkwaya as reported by African Rights that occurred at Kamarampaka Stadium:
―Since they did not know the faces of the people they wanted, people were able to
hide. Women concealed men by lending them their clothes. Absolutely no one
responded to the names they called out. They became furious. They called for all
men to come out and form lines. So the men had no choice. They asked them to
show their identity cards. This was just theatrics since there were only Tutsis in
the stadium. They looked closely at the faces, seeking out educated men and those
who ―looked‖ wealthy. They asked between twenty and thirty men to step aside.
No one could refuse because the orders were given at gun point. They were taken
to Gatandara, about one kilometre away, and killed by the militia with machetes‖
(74).

The goal of targeting males was twofold: to leave the women unguarded and to stave the threat
of a future enemy. Literally, the Tutsi were emasculated.
The 1994 Rwandan genocide fits within the parameters of Hiebert‘s Three Switches
theory. Over the course of fifty years, the Hutu became the in-group while the Tutsi became the
out-group or the ‗Other‘. This period of time also contained violence and other genocides which
further isolated the Tutsi from the Hutu and allowed for fear and hatred to grow and fester. The
super-human and sub-human stages appear in this case more consecutively because of the lack of
open warfare immediately preceding the genocide and that there was a definitive start to the
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genocide. It could be argued that the super-human stage actually began to form in the early years
of Rwandan independence where it was commonly thought the Tutsi had been given more
political power than what was deserved. This stage continually expanded throughout the next
fifty years through violence and genocide. As it expanded, Tutsi women were included in the
elevation of Tutsi as super-human giving them sexual power over Hutu men. This expansion was
concurrent with the sub-human stage. The beginnings of the sub-human stage coincided with the
RPF invasion in 1990. The propaganda commonly used derogatory terms such as ‗inyenzi‘ to
refer to Tutsi as being nothing more than cockroaches, as being less than human. The testimonies
included in this case study portray the attitudes toward Tutsi leading up to and during the 1994
genocide explicitly detailing the hatred towards and jealousy of Tutsi women. The extremist
Hutus held the imagined and unsupported certainty that the Tutsi believed themselves to be
superior to the Hutu, and thus must be brought down. It is this social psychology which seemed
to motivate and push the genocidaires to kill and rape.
The gendering and racializing of power is the most apparent in this case study because of
the focus on the constructed and imagined differences between the Hutu and Tutsi and the focus
on political and sexual power. The identification cards initiated by the Belgian colonizers played
a significant role in maintain the so-called ethnic difference between the Hutu and the Tutsi so
that when the more extremist Hutu gained control of the government, they were further able to
isolate the Tutsi by removing them from positions viewed with authority. Tutsi men in the years
prior to 1994 were continually emasculated while Tutsi women were given amplified sexual
power thus determining them to be great seducers of men. The power relationship that emerged
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was strictly along ethnic and gendered lines causing a severe imbalance and separation between
the Hutu and Tutsi.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CASE STUDY III: THE SUDANESE GENOCIDES
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Government of Sudan (GoS) started targeting Black
African ethnic groups first targeting the Nuba for genocide during the civil war between GoS and
South Sudan, and then committing genocide against the ethnic groups in Darfur. In June 2011,
the Nuba peoples were being targeted again with armed bombardment, and at this time, no active
warfare has yet to take place (Hill 2011; Reeves 2011). The increasing hubris of the leaders of
the GoS is becoming evident as they continue their acts of genocide with no tangible
consequences enforced by the international community.
The genocides of the Nuba and Darfur have been addressed separately by other scholars,
but it is the determination of this author that they should be analyzed collectively because
commonalities exist. First, the perpetrator for both genocides has been the Government of Sudan
under the leadership of President Omar Al-Bashir. Second, the Nuba and Darfurians identify and
are identified by the GoS as Black African. Those in control of the GoS and its supporters
typically identify themselves as Arab. This racial identity difference will be addressed more in
depth in the pre-genocidal conditions section of this chapter. Third, GoS genocidal tactics such
as artificial famine, murder, rape, and forced displacement have been consistently used against
each targeted group. On the surface at least, the genocides against the Nuba and Darfurians are
fundamentally connected because GoS‘s actions against the Nuba went unnoticed by most of the
international community thus giving a perceived allowance to begin continue targeting Darfur.
Temporally, the Darfur genocide followed the Nuba genocide, but knowledge of the Darfur
genocide is more wide-spread due to grassroots organization and celebrity attention.
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This case study departs in format from the previous two case studies slightly because of
the two victim groups and since the situations in Darfur and S. Kordofan are ongoing. Even with
continued attention on Darfur and the South Kordofan region of Sudan, and the issuance of a
warrant for President Al-Bashir for Crimes against Humanity and genocide, Sudan has not
emerged into a post-genocide society. The Darfur genocide is still occurring and renewed attacks
against the Nuba have taken placed resulting in the possibility of another genocide against a
group who faced genocide twenty years ago.
Sudanese Identities: Arab & African
Racial disparity and colonial influence are two contributing factors to the pre-genocidal
conditions in Sudan. Prior to the formation of the state of Sudan in 1956, the Nuba and Darfur
historically remained separate with neither ethnic collective interacting with each other except
with a few violent exceptions during the pre-colonial era (De Waal 1995). The commonalities
began to emerge under British colonial rule. Though racial disparity was not the intent of the
British colonizers, the effect was as such since those who had experience in government tended
to be Arab. This effect was felt in both the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur region. For example,
the Nuba were isolated as a part of British official policy in order to protect them from Arab
influences (De Waal 1995). After independence, the relationships of the Nuba and Darfur with
the government based out of Khartoum were tedious at best.
―The Nuba as a people have had their identity defined by outsiders. Essentially, ‗Nuba‘
was used by Egyptians and Northern Sudanese from the Nile to refer to black people to their
south, who they considered enslaveable‖ (De Waal 1995, 11). The Nuba have been considered
African and not of Arab descent, which the rulers of the GoS have claimed to be. This perceived
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difference is of great importance since being African has been considered subordinate to Arab
descent from the viewpoint of the Northern Sudanese. This imagined and so-called racial
difference is based in the belief that Arabs relocated into Northern Sudan multiple generations
ago. This perceived difference constructs the identity of the Nuba as inferior and is at the root of
their subjugation.
The relationship between the GoS and Darfur varied only slightly. The imagined
difference between Arabs and Africans has also existed in the Darfur region of Sudan. Those
residing in this region have been considered black African therefore also inferior to the Arabs of
northern Sudan and victims of this so-called racial difference. The main difference between the
Nuba and Darfur besides location has been religious practice with Darfuri primarily practicing
Islam, but since the Darfuri were not the Arab Muslims that have held power in Khartoum, they
have been relegated to second-class citizenry (Prunier 2005). Prior to British colonial rule,
Darfur was a sultanate with its own power structure and wealth, but Khartoum rule has since
caused this to fall away. The Darfur region has been one of the poorest regions in Sudan. Those
who resided in Darfur faced famine due to the nature of the primarily barren land and political
disenfranchisement.
Caught In the Middle: The Nuba Genocide
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2002 by the government of Sudan
based in Khartoum and the political wing of the SPLA. Within the CPA, the Nuba region was
barely mentioned. The borders of Northern Sudan were drawn to include the Nuba region.
Because of this, the Nuba was not included in the voted which determined sovereignty for
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southern Sudan. Even today, they are forgotten, and the policies carried out by the government of
Sudan against them go unnoticed as well.
The Nuba culture is a collection of ethnic groups residing in a mountainous region
located in central Sudan. The location is of the utmost importance because the region lies on the
border with Southern Sudan. Although most expressed an allegiance to the SPLA and the
political arm, Sudanese Peoples‘ Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Nuba were left under the
control of the government of Sudan. This political situation left the Nuba helpless in the face of
the Sudanese government‘s policies toward them. The Nuba have observed religious tolerance
with integration between the three main religious beliefs practiced: Christian, Sufi Muslim and
Animist. The Nuba culture has been mainly agrarian which left them relying primarily on the
land for sustenance.
The war between the North and South Sudan began in 1985, and the Nuba were not
participants until the SPLA crossed into the Nuba Mountains in 1987. Tensions began to increase
between the Nuba and Arabs who were aligned with the GoS since the SPLA was rumored to be
in the area. The Nuba were forced to take sides, and they chose the SPLA (De Waal 1995). The
National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in 1989 under the leadership of al-Bashir and in
1992 declared a jihad against the Nuba (Winter 2000). All Nuba were targeted, Christian and
Muslim alike, since the GoS portrayed Nuba Muslims as not true Muslims since they were not
Arab Muslims. Attacks by the GoS and affiliated militias continued, and as the Nuba were forced
to leave their land in search of shelter and food, GoS peace camps began to sprout up. The GoS
denied war was happening in the Nuba Mountains and encouraged the idea that the peace camps
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were for the benefit of the Nuba. Concurrently, they also blacked out information coming in and
going out of the Nuba Mountains and forbade outsider entry (Winter 2000).
The famine in the Nuba region in the early nineties consisted of multiple factors. It was
naturally occurring as a part of the environmental cycle, but the policies of scorching the earth in
the Nuba Mountains and withholding foreign food aid made the famine an act of genocide. The
famine was made substantially worse by the government as a tool in their overall goal of wiping
out the Nuba culture. The following is an account of the famine by Joseph Aloga Jargi:
In 1990 and 1991 the army and the militia came and burned Timbera, Karandel,
Lao and Um Derdu, where the people had deserted to the mountains. The enemy
burned all the 1990 harvest and then prevented people from cultivating during
1991 by patrolling and burning.
By 1992 there was severe hunger. People sold their cattle and all other things,
even clothes, to buy food. People moved even as far as Fariang. Many people
died. I remember that one whole family of twenty people died from starvation; I
remember because I was one of those who found them lying dead when we
opened the house.
The 1993 famine was less severe than that of 1991 and 1992. Some of the people
were able to cultivate. Some were even able to store food. Many people who
migrated to Nagorban or Buram were able to find food or some trade. Buram had
much commercial activity then. The people have mostly now returned. 1994 was
a better year. But the people are without clothes‖ (De Waal 1995, 93).
De Waal (1995) defined Tamshit, or ―Combing‖ as ―the obliteration of everything that exists in
the areas not under the direct day-to-day control of the government forces‖ (159). Whole villages
were be destroyed, forcing people further into the mountains or to peace camps controlled by the
Northern Sudanese government. After the Northern Sudanese occupation of the Nuba region,
foreign food aid was purposefully withheld from the Nuba peoples expediting the famine with
the result of death and causing the forced relocation starving women and children to peace camps
where worse horrors awaited them.
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Genocidal Rape
―They call them peace camps, but they are not peaceful places. The people are
divided into four groups: the boys to be trained as soldiers for indoctrination; the
girls to be taken as wives for soldiers; the adults are taken to work in the military
farms. If they suspect you are a rebel soldier, you will be killed immediately‖
(Cdr. Yousif Karra Harun via translator [video] 1999).
Government controlled, rape was commonplace in these camps. Women and their
children were lured to these peace camps with the promise of food, clothing, and medicine
(McFarland 2008). These women were given very little of what was promised, and if it was
given, it was because they submitted to the camp supervisors wishes.
―The entire power structure of these government-controlled peace camps was
designed to compel women and girls to submit to rape. The soldiers often force
themselves on the women, or may coerce women into sex with threats, by
withholding food, clothes or access to water, or may punish women who refuse to
submit. As a matter of policy, soldiers are also encouraged to take temporary
‗wives‘ from the Nuba captives‖ (De Waal 1995, 220).
Peace camps were specifically intended to separate the men and women to prevent Nuba births
through enforced impregnation (De Waal 1995). Any pregnancies resulting from the rapes
further isolated the Nuba women since their children‘s lineage could not be identified. Marriage
in the peace camps became synonymous with slavery as Northern Sudanese soldiers verbally
declared ownership of the Nuba women as ‗wives‘, and those who did not willingly submit
would be beaten and raped (De Waal 1995). Rape was the official policy of the GoS (De Waal
2010). The following account was taken from the African Rights Report, Facing Genocide: The
Nuba of Sudan (De Waal 1995). In this testimony, Fawzia Jibreel described how rape was used
to physically harm and humiliate the women:
―When we arrived in Mendi, we were taken to the garrison. All the looted
properties were put in one place. The people were then divided. The older women
were taken to one place, adult women who had one or two children were taken to
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another place, and unmarried girls were taken to another place. Before we were
divided up, the officer said to us, 'Now you have reached here, every one of you
will be married. If any one of you refuses, you will be killed.' Then we were given
a small amount of flour to cook and told, 'When you are married you will have
enough food to eat.'
Five of the women were already married. Three of them I knew: Khaltuma, Nura
and Zeinab. Two of them I didn't know. Those of us who were still unmarried, the
soldiers came in the morning and told us to work, carrying heavy things. Then
they demanded sex. Those who refused to have sex were treated badly; they were
forced to carry heavy things all day. In the evening, we were brought back to our
place in the military camp to sleep.
After dark, the soldiers came and took the girls to their rooms, and raped them. I
was taken and raped, but I refused to be 'married' to any of them. The girls who
were 'married' were treated better— they stayed in the rooms of their 'husbands'.
But, when the soldier is transferred, the woman stays behind, whether she has a
child by the soldier or not. I saw some women who were remaining behind, but I
don't know their names.
When you have been taken, the soldier who has taken you will do what he wants,
then he will go out of the room, you will stay, and another one will come. It
continues like this. There is different behaviour. Some lady, if she is raped by four
or five soldiers, she will cry from pain. Then, if the soldiers are good, they will
leave her. But others will beat her to keep her quiet, and they will carry on.
Every day the raping continued. It continued during the daytime and at night. My
sister Leila, aged thirteen, was raped. My father's second wife, Asia, was raped.
They wanted to rape my father's third wife, Naima, but she was heavily pregnant
and she objected, and in the end nothing happened to her. Another lady, Umjuma,
who has six children, was also raped.
It is impossible to count the men who raped me. It was continuous. Perhaps in a
week I would have only one day of rest. Sometimes one man will take me for the
whole night. Sometimes I will be raped by four or five men per day or night; they
will just be changing one for another‖ (De Waal 1995, 229-30).
Another testimony came from Miram Haroun Kuku (not real name) in which she described the
systematic harassment and rape at the hands of the GoS soldiers:
Last Sunday we were going with other girls—about fifty—and twenty boys from
Kumu to Heiban to collect mangoes from the gardens. We left Kumu in the early
morning and at about 7:00 a.m. we entered the gardens of Heiban. When we were
about to put our baskets down to collect the mangoes we were immediately
surrounded by the enemy soldiers.
I found myself with about forty people surrounded by the enemy who ordered us
to sit down. We sat down with guns pointed at us. The soldiers separated us from
the boys. In turn we girls were also divided into groups. Every group of three girls
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was guarded by a soldier. The soldier guarding me with other two girls took us to
a khor near the garden and ordered us to sit down. The two girls with me were
Rhoda and Halima.
When we sat down five soldiers came to us. Three soldiers ordered us to lie down
to have sex with them. I was surprised and tried to resist but I was beaten by all of
them. They beat me with heavy sticks they were carrying. While I and other girls
were being raped by three soldiers, some other three soldiers stood guard over us.
One of the soldiers on guard after a long time cried out saying 'khalas!' ['enough'
or 'finished'] and the three raping us got up. I was about to get up when I heard
another soldier ordering me to stay in the position I was in. He came and raped
me. The other two girls were also raped. It was now the turn of the soldiers on
guard. The soldiers continued raping us in turns for a long time. I can say we were
raped from morning until just a little before sunset.
All the girls captured in the garden were raped. The men were beaten badly as
they were being called cowards and rebels (De Waal 1995, 223-4).
Forced military service was also commonplace for Nuba men by the Sudanese
government. Nuba men as part of a government militia became responsible for the destruction of
villages and homes. Once integrated into the militias, Nuba men were coerced into raping Nuba
women. This turned them into criminals, and the fabric of the multiple Nuba communities was
torn apart by these acts. ―The fact that many of the rapists were themselves Nuba in no way
lessened the fact that the aim of the policy of rape was genocide‖ (De Waal 1995, 222). If
pregnancy was a result of the rape, women would still be shunned since the father would not be
known.
It should be noted that the Nuba region was also isolated because the Sudanese forbade
any UN aid, non-governmental organization aid, or foreign media from entering the area. The
isolation has been managed so well that McFarland (2008) found difficulties in obtaining
primary sources about the situation in Nuba. Most of the women she interviewed were refugees
located in Cairo.
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Indoctrination
Arabization and Islamization were deeply intertwined and typically seen with the
indoctrination techniques occurring within the peace camps. Men and boys, raised as Sufi
Muslim, Christian or Animist, were forcibly converted to the Northern Sudanese conception of
Islam. The deconstruction of the Nuba identity through religious identification was immediate
and quickly replaced by the Northern Sudanese Arab identity through indoctrination. Being
Nuba became less desirable and less safe. The Northern Sudanese have defined the Nuba as an
out-group since they were perceived as having different ethnicity and religious beliefs. As
another tool used in the extermination of the Nuba peoples, these indirect policies promoted the
differentiation between the Northern Sudanese and the Nuba creating a circumstance where the
Nuba are able to be viewed as less than human. This indirect policy reinforces the direct policies
previously mentioned and justifies the genocide.
In the attempt to remove the Nuba culture, the GoS implemented schools in the peace
camps to reeducate the Nuba children to become Sudanese Arab Muslim.
―For those children staying in Um Dorein and al Atmur [peace camps], now they
have schools for them. They are khalwas [Koranic schools], and they are only
taught Arabic and the Koran. At the beginning, the parents of children refused to
allow them to go to the school, because they were only Islamic schools, but the
authorities decided to cook zelabiya [cake/bread] for them, and also provide tea,
so the children began to go of their own accord. After some time, the parents were
told, 'We are taking the children to Um Ruwaba for further education so that they
can return and take positions of responsibility in the Nuba Mountains'‖ (De Waal
1995, 256).
It should be noted that these children were never seen by their parents again (De Waal 1995).
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Trouble in the West
The conflict in Darfur came into being through multiple reasons. Severe droughts during
the eighties and nineties caused famine and desertification in an already barren area resulting in
dissention and minor skirmishes over food, water, and shelter. Those residing in Darfur were
from multiple African and nomadic Arab tribes. As the discord worsened and the GoS‘s refusal
to support the African tribes, primarily the Fur Massaleit and Zaghawa tribes, two rebel groups
emerged: Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The lack
of support of the African tribes was directly related to the concept of Arab supremacism.
―Arab supremacism is an ideology that preaches, promotes, and sustains –in
certain situations, at all cost- the notion that Arab beliefs and way of life are
superior to all others. Essentially, it calls for Arab dominance in all aspects of life
–culturally, politically, economically, judicially, and socially‖ (Totten 2011, 7).
The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood within the power structure of the GoS and a soft coup
1999 engineered by al-Bashir removing Turabi from power increased the reach of Arab
supremacism and fractured the relationship between the Darfuri and the Arabs of the GoS.
Darfuri were recruited into the war with the SPLA but also were targeted at home
because their lack of status as Arab Muslims. Being forced to fight for a government that viewed
them as inferior exposed the inequality. The JEM published the ‗Black Book‘ detailing Darfuri
grievances such as disenfranchisement, but for the Darfuri as second-class Muslims to address
the gulf between Khartoum and the Darfuri population was an insult:
―When Darfur militants came out with the kitab al-aswad (―Black Book‖) in
2000, it said nothing to the average Northern Sudanese that they did not know
already. What created a shock were not the contents of the book but simply the
fact that an unspoken taboo had been broken and somebody had dared to put into
print what everybody knew but did not want to talk about‖ (Prunier 2005, 77).
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The situation in Darfur began to gain the attention of the international community through
reports of an extreme increase in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, and destruction
of villages. Secretary of State Colin Powell‘s testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in which he named the conflict as genocide brought Darfur to the forefront (LeBor
2006). Along with a grassroots effort by the NGO, Save Darfur, with an ever expanding list of
vocal international celebrities including Leonardo DiCaprio and George Clooney, the conflict in
Darfur was added to the genocide list. However, the conclusion by the UN‘s Commission of
Inquiry was while the acts of the GoS and Janjaweed demonstrated crimes against humanity, the
intent of genocide by the GoS was not present (LeBor 2006).
War, Genocide & Denial
With the situation in Darfur, two concurrent actions have been taking place: the war
between the rebel groups, SLA and JEM, and the GoS and militias or Janjaweed, and the
genocide inflicted upon the civilian population by the GoS and militias. These actions have been
interrelated since the GoS and Janjaweed violence as a method of counter-insurgency towards
the civilian population has been disproportionate to and in response to SLA and JEM attacks.
The GoS set to quell a rebellion but at the same time denying that one was taking place and
distancing itself from the Janjaweed (Prunier 2005). In an attempt to understand how the
genocide occurred, Prunier (2005) offered this explanation:
―In an atmosphere charged with racism an armed rebellion by the ‗inferior group‘
is fraught with enormous danger for the civilians of that group. Counterinsurgency in Darfur could perhaps only have gone wrong. This was not ‗counterinsurgency‘ organized by a government trying to restore law and order; it was an
answer with arms by a racially and culturally dominant group to the insurrection
of a racially and culturally subject group. The hope that repression could be
limited to combatants was completely unrealistic‖ (Prunier 2005, 154-5).
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The war between the rebel groups and the GoS does not preclude genocide. The lack of
resolution with Darfur has led to a situation where genocide has been either downplayed (De
Waal 2011) or used as a tool of the rebellion to gain sympathy of the international community
(Assal and IDF 2010). It is the author‘s belief that if there were to be a trial of al-Bashir and
others, a better understanding of events can be reached, and the propaganda can be realized.
Genocidal Rape
Similar to the genocide of the Nuba, rape was used as a means to humiliate, terrorize, and
tear apart the social network in Darfur. Currently, it is not known whether rape has been
encouraged or sanctioned by the GoS specifically, but accounts have been documented detailing
comments from the Janjaweed and soldiers referring to not being authentic Sudanese and the
darkness of the victim‘s skin color (Totten 2011). Darfur women were under constant threat of
rape since the Janjaweed would patrol the roads leading to markets. Legally and socially, women
who were raped would be shamed and ostracized from society especially if a pregnancy were to
result. The use of rape was systematic as way to terrorize the civilian population of Darfur. The
account below was taken from the interview of Kaltouma Mohammed Adam conducted by
Totten (2011) on December 13, 2009 with the assistance of Hussein Idriss as translator.
―The Arabs did not want Jugma destroyed because it was one of the biggest
villages and the place where the Arabs could obtain what they wanted and needed.
So they forced all of the people [inhabitants] to remain in the village and began
raping the girls and women.
Today, there are many children who were born due to those rapes. Some of my
family was raped there. My older sister, who was not married, was raped twice
and both times she had a baby from those rapes. Two babies!
Arabs and GoS soldiers did this. Anytime they wanted to rape her, they did. If
they saw her in the suq, they‘d take her; if they saw her along a path and wanted
to rape her, they would. And sometimes they even came to my family‘s home and
took her with them and raped her.
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One of our brothers saw that she was bringing a bastard child to our family and
told her that it‘s not acceptable to the family. He talked very hard to her. When
the men came again for my sister, she told them that our brother was very mad
about what they were doing to her, so they went to see my brother, and told him:
‗This is none of your business, and If you scold this girl again, we will kill you.‘
My brother told the man who raped her, ‗If you want to marry her, then marry her
and have legitimate children.‘ The man said, ‗I will not marry her, and if you
interfere I will kill you.‘ Our brother could do nothing. These people are
colonizing [controlling and terrorizing] our brothers.
Because we could not leave the village and could not change the situation, our
family gave her [their sister] a separate plot to live on in which there is a oneroom hut and a fireplace outside [a lean-to] to cook meals on.
When I returned to Monono, I traveled with six other women. All are my family
members: my father‘s mother, my father‘s brother‘s daughter, my father‘s
mother‘s brother‘s grandchild, and other female relatives. We arrived at a wadi at
four o‘clock in the evening [afternoon]. That‘s the time the Janjaweed rob and kill
people. We were on donkeys. I was in front on my donkey, carry cooking oil and
onions. That is my trade; I trade in oil and onions. When we were crossing the
wadi, four Arabs approached with their weapons, Kalashnikovs, and they shot
four bullets in the air and forced us to stop. They ordered us to get down from our
donkeys. They were in civilian clothes, but had turbans on, with only their eyes
showing. Two women in the middle [of her group] jumped off their donkeys and
fled on foot. The Arabs rushed over to my donkey and pulled all of the goods off
of it and placed them along the path. While two remained and kept their weapons
on us, one took the oil across the brook. Then the man who took the oil came back
to take my shoes, money, onions, and the biscuits I purchased for my children. I
said, ‗Don‘t take these things [the biscuits].‘ He said, ‗Forget about these things. I
not only want your goods but you also.‘ All the other women began yelling, ‗We
do not accept you raping her‘ Then I went to retrieve the oil. One of the other
women went with me to try to protect me from rape, but then all three of the men
shot their weapons in the air and the child on the back of the other woman started
screaming. When the child started screaming, she [the mother] stepped away from
where we were. When she stepped away one of the men said, ‗We will not only
rape you, but impregnate you with a child.‘ I told them, ‗Instead of raping me, it is
better to kill me.‘
Immediately, one of the men hit me on the neck with a stick from behind, and I
fell down. Once came with a knife and ripped off my tob [a sari-like dress] and
sliced off my underclothes with the knife and threw me to the ground and started
raping me. The other women screamed and screamed until they finished. After all
three raped me, they took the oil and poured it on the ground. Then one said, ‗You
are rubbish! Get out of here!‘
As I got up, one said, ‗We could rape you anywhere. Even in your village‘‖
(Totten 2011, 99-101).
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Similar to the accounts from the Nuba genocide, women were harassed and terrorized by GoS
and Janjaweed through the constant threat of rape in the execution of their daily routines.
Pregnancies as a result of the rapes shamed the Darfuri women and isolated them from society.
Even though most did not result in death, the use of rape against the Darfuri should be
considered genocidal because of the intent to remove the Black African ethnicity through forced
maternity, the continual and systematic daily raping of women to terrorize and humiliate, and the
foreknowledge that the effect of the forced maternity would shame and isolate the women thus
ripping the culture apart and keeping Darfuri births from taking place.
The Sudanese genocides do not fit neatly into Hiebert‘s (2008) Three Switches theory but
do contain aspects that support the case‘s inclusion. Factors detrimental to the case include the
lack of multiplicity of sources for the Nuba genocide and the lack of cohesiveness in the
literature for the Darfur genocide, but these may be the result of the lack of availability of
unbiased information not controlled by the GoS or humanitarian NGOs with good intentions.
The ‗Other‘ switch was reached over the course of hundreds of years through the continued
belief in the imagined difference between Black African and Arab, and the religious differences
between the Nuba and those in the GoS leadership. Information detailing the super-human switch
being reached has been more evasive. This does not mean that the stage had not been reached,
but rather in comparison to the other cases, the sources denoting its occurrence are lacking. The
combination of the war between the GoS and the SPLA with the Nuba genocide makes it
difficult to locate a definitive occurrence of this stage. The GoS did place an overreaching
responsibility on the Nuba, and the Nuba were targeted through jihad apart from the SPLA
because of the GoS belief that they were a threat to the GoS in spite of having few military
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resources separate from the SPLA. The super-human switch for the Darfur genocide can be
noted in the reaction against the civilian population for actions committed by the SLA and JEM
rebel groups. In essence, the Darfuri population was held responsible for the actions of a few.
The sub-human switch for both the Nuba and Darfur genocides is rooted in the perception of the
Black African as being less.
The Sudanese genocides do demonstrate the gendering and racializing of the power
relationship present between the GoS and the Nuba and the Darfuri population. The imagined
ethnic differences between the Black African and the Arab caused a racialized power
relationship because of the belief in Arab superiority. Through the use of genocidal rape to
humiliate and to tear apart the Nuba and Darfuri cultures, the power relationship also became
gendered.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS
The goal was to determine if power in the case study genocides had been gendered and/or
racialized. The descent into genocide for each of the case studies demonstrated a desire, if not
need, for the in-group to seek dominance over the target groups. Identity constructs apparent in
the memories, histories, and legends reinforced the perception of target group inferiority. The
official and high use of rape reflected a desire to illustrate the perceived inferiority to the target
group. The intention to dehumanize is apparent with the case studies of the Balkan genocides and
the 1994 Rwanda genocide in response to a perceived threat, real and/or imagined. The threat
became exaggerated through propaganda thus increasing participation. The racialization of the
power relationship came about through the hardening of identities. The gendering of the power
relationship between the in-group and the out-group emerged as a result of the need for the outgroup to be viewed as less. This need and perception allowed for the genocides to take place.
In Sudan, the dehumanizing intentions behind the genocide against the Nuba are clearer
than the Darfuri genocide. The peace camps similar to the concentration camps seen in the
Balkan genocides epitomized the need to dehumanize the target group through isolation, rape,
and forced marriages. Testimonials from the 1994 Rwandan genocide recount the use of
humiliation through rape and the elimination of the male population because of the fear of future
retribution. The Balkan genocides displayed similar tools as the 1994 Rwanda genocide, and
rape was used as a means of forced impregnation to remove ethnicity. The genocidal tools used
demonstrated the need to dominate. Propaganda was used to justify the genocidaires actions, and
rape, gendercide, and indoctrination reinforced the genocidal power relationship.
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Commonalities between the case studies are most explicit in the genocidal tools used.
Genocidal rape used in each case demonstrated a willingness of each perpetrator group to
remove each victim group‘s ethnicity and to intimidate and force submission. This is evident in
the testimonies. Rape was used as a way to prevent births of the victim group in each case study.
In the Balkan and Sudanese case studies, rape was used as a way to induce the forced maternity
of either Serb or Arab children, and in the Rwandan case study, the mutilation of female sexual
organs was prevalent. In each case study, propaganda was used specifically by the perpetrator
groups as a way to blame the victim groups. The Serbs, Hutu, and GoS Arabs all accused their
victims of misrepresenting events in order to gain sympathy from the US and UN. While the
propaganda of the GoS has yet to be fully realized, much of the information put forth by the GoS
and its supporters echoes the propaganda of the Serbian government and the extremist Hutu
supported RTLM.
Table 2: Case Studies’ Summary

Case Studies

Other Switch
Reached?

Sub-human
Switch
reached?
Yes

Power
Racialized?

Power
Gendered?

Yes

Super-human
Switch
reached?
Yes

Balkan
Genocides
1994 Rwandan
Genocide
Sudanese
Genocides

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

??

Yes

Yes

Yes

The case studies demonstrate how the power relationship between the in-group and outgroup can become gendered and racialized in the escalation towards genocide. This relationship
is sustained throughout the genocide and would in theory diminish once the genocide has
concluded, but none of the case studies have completely moved into a post-genocide phase. The
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importance of the analysis of this gendered and racialized power relationship is to further explore
the importance of gender and ethnic identity and to locate the application of perceived gender
roles in the progression towards genocide. This thesis specifically addresses the power
relationship in genocide because the hardening of identity, ethnic and gender, is most apparent in
cases of genocide. This does not mean that it does not occur in other cases of violent conflict, but
rather more variables exist in cases of general violent conflict shading gender and ethnic aspects
of identity. In cases of genocide, ethnic identity and perceived gender roles play major positions
in targeting of the victim group and the genocidal tools used. Also, this thesis is to serve as a
study of genocide specifically.
A few avenues exist to expand the theory presented in this thesis. First, a study of the
perception of gender in the case study states should be broached. Through interviews of citizens,
what it means to be masculine and feminine in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan needs to be
determined. The question remains whether these perceptions coincide with the dominant Western
perceptions of gender roles. Also, it may serve to analyze gender roles in high conflict areas such
as Syria and Iran to see if the theory can be applied to conflictual but non-genocidal situations.
Second, a study of emerging conflictual situations to determine if gender and ethnic dimensions
are present, if a pre-genocidal stage has been reached, and if a likelihood of genocide exists
should also be broached. Still, this would have to be done with care since applying a theory of
genocide to a non-genocidal but conflictual situation could be problematic and possibly flawed.
Genocide theories such as this one are retrospective, and proving the theory would require
analysis in the early stages of a conflictual relationship between an in-group and an out-group
before violence begins to take place.
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After Genocide
In dealing with the memory of genocide, the question remains whether real reconciliation
can take place. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda have taken two different paths in an attempt to
find reconciliation, but it is the opinion of the author that neither has been successful.
The constitution dictated by the Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina made specific
reference to the Bosniak, Croat and Serb identities. Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided into two
entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with majorities of Croats and Bosniaks and the
Republika Srpska dominated by Serbs. According to the constitution, the House of Peoples was
to be divided between these three identities, and Bosnia-Herzegovina has three presidents
representing each of the major ethnic identifications. The ethnic distinctions prevalent in the
years prior to the war and genocide were absorbed as legal distinctions, and recently, the
consequences of the rush for peace have emerged. Segregation between the ethnicities has
become commonplace with little to no interaction in schools or businesses (Englehart 2011).
This is measurably different from pre-war/genocide. Leaders of the Republika Srpska have
threatened to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina leaving it ever more fragile and in danger of
failing.
For Balkans, history remains a part of their active consciousnesses and memories. So thus
it stands to reason that the war and genocide still play a predominant role in the consciousnesses
of those who remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those who have survived Srebrenica or lost
husbands, sons and brothers still carry the loss and are still looking for answers. The resentment
is mirrored in the actions of the nationalistic and extremist factions driving apart the country.
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While the identities are present legally, the problems between Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs
remain unaddressed and unspoken.
Rwanda took a slightly different approach. Since the 1994 genocide, reference to ethnic
identities such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have been outlawed by the Rwandan government in
public discourse, but new identities have emerged. These identities have formed within the
dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, and these traumatic and criminal identities are related to the
pre-genocide ethnic identities with Survivor and Old Caseload group identities limited to Tutsi
identification, and New Caseload, Suspected Génocidaire, and Prisoner group identities
restricted to the Hutu identification. This identification system largely ignores the Hutu victims
of the 1994 genocide. Since the Hutu are not considered survivors by the government, they
cannot seek justice for the crimes against them. Even if a member of the New Caseload group
did not take part in the 1994 genocide, that person would be automatically suspected of
participation, especially if he or she had a Hutu relative (Hintjens 2008, Hintjens 2009). Based
upon these classifications, the in-group and out-group pre-genocide roles are reversed as old
caseload and survivors have become the in-group and all others have become the out-group
(Parent 2010).
The new, emerging traumatic and criminal identities are based in anger and resentment
further driving apart the groups. The Gacaca Courts, implemented in the desire to speed the
judicial process, have institutionalized these new identities since Hutu victims of the 1994
genocide and the massacres in the refugee camps cannot be considered survivors and are not able
to seek justice for the crimes committed against them (Hintjens 2009). The Gacaca Courts, used
after 2001 to relocate the power to try and convict génocidaires to the local jurisdictions in
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Rwanda, have been characterized by their informality and lack of procedural norms (Apuuli
2009). The magistrates reside in the area to which they hold court, have a familiarity with the
victims and suspected perpetrators, and typically identify as Tutsi or Old Caseload. The laws
criminalizing genocide denial and political parties promoting divisionism (Organic Laws
47/2001 and 18/2008) with their vague language can be interpreted subjectively and have been
used by the RPF-led government to silence dissent and outlaw opposition parties (Waldorf
2009). These factors in combination suggest an environment ripe for an escalation of violence
and a potentiality for another genocide.
Because of the ICTY and ICTR, information has been gathered detailing the genocides
through witness testimony and records. The Sudan genocides have had no such resolution. As it
stands, al-Bashir and the GoS have not supplied the ICC with any documents and actively deny
its involvement with the Darfur conflict and have justified their military maneuvers in S.
Kordofan as actions against insurgents. The conflict in Darfur has become a chaotic situation
with each side blaming the other. The lack of resolution and cohesive literature has made it
difficult to reach a solid and unbiased view of events.
Sudan, ranked third on the 2011 Failed State Index (Foreign Policy website), remains a
genocidal state because of the denial of continued actions against the Nuba and the Darfuri
civilian population. In 2011, S. Sudan became independent from Sudan, but the attacks on the
Nuba in S. Kordofan have continued. First, in June 2011, mass graves were discovered in the S.
Kordofan region, and air attacks from the GoS have been plaguing its residents (Hill 2011;
Reeves 2011). Recently, news reports began to emerge about the heavy mobilization of GoS
troops into the S. Kordofan region (Sudan Sentinel Project website). Famine in both the S.
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Kordofan and Darfur regions has become markedly worse. With aid controlled by the GoS, it is
unclear whether those who are in need are receiving it.
Identities in each of the cases remain hardened along ethnic lines. This could prove to be
dangerous to any attempts at reconciliation, and begs the question: can societal groups truly be
reconciled after the damage of genocide.
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